RETURN TO SENDER?:
Inadvertent Disclosure Of Privileged Information

Richard J. Heafey

SYNOPSIS
A 1992 ABA Ethics Opinion directs lawyers not to read
privileged information inadvertently sent by an adversary or other
attorney. But the ethical obligations all lawyers owe to the courts and
to their own clients conflict with that opinion. A better rule would hold
that information does not remain privileged after it has been
voluntarily transmitted to an opposing lawyer.
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“The inadvertent production of a privileged document is a spectre that
haunts every document intensive case.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
With the volume of documents exchanged in discovery in even
a typical lawsuit, let alone in complex matters such as class actions
or multi-district litigation, the chances are great that some document
produced will inadvertently disclose privileged information. This is
especially true when so much information is created, stored and even
produced electronically, so that an attorney can produce a document
simply by clicking its title on a computer screen, forwarding it in its
entirety without reviewing its contents.
And yet no clear rules exist to guide litigants and courts when
privileged information is accidentally given to an adversary.
Not even the American Bar Association provides clear
guidance, approving a Model Rule that contradicts earlier ABA ethics
opinions, perhaps because state and county bars have variously
accepted, modified, or outright rejected this 1992 ABA opinion.
Reported court decisions are all over the map as well. Some
hold that disclosure of privileged material always waives the privilege;
others hold that it never waives the privilege. And, while the majority
of decisions require examining all the circumstances to ferret out
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Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 480
(E.D. Va. 1991).
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whether the disclosure was “inadvertent” or the result of negligent
(i.e., careless) handling of privileged information, what constitutes
negligence in one court is evidence of due diligence for another. 2
The different approaches to inadvertent disclosure reflect not
only different tolerance of attorney error in light of the desire to
promote professional collegiality, but also different philosophies
concerning the relative merit of the attorney-client privilege itself (and
the work product doctrine), when balanced against other values.
Some courts and commentators view the attorney-client
privilege as fundamental and nearly absolute, and believe it is
necessary to encourage full communication between attorney and
client.3 Courts following this view require an attorney receiving an
2

Ken A. Zeidner, Inadvertent Disclosure and The Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to
The Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1315, 1319 (2001) “The lack
of a single methodology for addressing inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents
has resulted in confusion within the federal court system. None of the three approaches,
however, adequately resolves the issue of inadvertent disclosure. The strict liability
approach, though predictable, ‘fails to give adequate recognition to the underlying values
of the attorney-client privilege, which are to encourage full and frank communication with
counsel and ensure effective legal representation.’ The subjective intent approach,
though also predictable, produces a ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ approach [which]
creates a risk of undermining the appearance of justice.’ The circumstances approach,
though attempting to balance conflicting privilege and discovery policies, ‘results in an
uncertain privilege[,] . . . the protection of [which] will depend on courts reviewing and
making judgments on a broad array of facts’.”
See, also, Ken A. Zeidner, Inadvertent Disclosure of the Attorney-Client Privilege:
Looking to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1315, 1356 (2001)
where author suggests “[a] better approach to inadvertent disclosure would . . . be
accomplished by presuming that the attorney-client privilege was not waived by the
inadvertent disclosure, but allowing the receiving party to rebut this presumption by a
showing of substantial need for the documents and undue hardship in obtaining their
substantial equivalent: in effect, treating the inadvertent disclosure as attorney work
product.”
3
But see, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying
Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 145, 149
(2004): “Treating privileges as absolute is undeniably comforting to the members of the
professions which enjoy the privileges. Further, classifying the privilege as absolute
simplifies the courts’ task in administering privilege rules. However, the basic question is
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opponent’s privileged information to be extremely discreet: to stop
reading the material; to notify the sender that they’ve received it; to
confer with the sender; and then to follow the sender’s directions
about what to do with the materials.
In effect, these decisions require that attorneys, as officers of
the court, “protect the privilege” of confidentiality, even if it is an
opponent’s privilege.
Other courts and commentators, like Professor Monroe
Freedman, view the attorney-client privilege as one important value in
a justice system serving other important, perhaps even more
important, values, such as zealous advocacy and the pursuit of truth
through an adversarial trial on the merits
This article will examine each of these two fundamental views,
analyze the impracticality of burdening a receiving attorney with
obligations of confidentiality ostensibly owed by the other side’s
lawyer, and discuss fairness and other questions of right and wrong.
It concludes that cases supporting the return of inadvertently
disclosed privileged materials are without ethical support or a
convincing legal foundation; instead, that the rules of evidence,
including those that govern waiver of evidentiary objections, should
determine the disposition of the material, including its admissibility.

the validity of the behavioral assumption underlying Wigmore’s insistence on absolute
privileges. Is it true that but for an evidentiary privilege, the average layperson standing in
a confidential relationship would not consult or confide? Simply stated, that
generalization is flawed . . .”
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II. SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM
It seems to happen all the time: You receive a letter,
memorandum, fax or e-mail that is a communication between your
adversary and her client. Maybe it was just information that they
didn’t want to or have to disclose; maybe it was your adversary’s
playbook, describing weak points in their case or the vulnerabilities of
their witnesses. For instance:
1.

Counsel drafts a letter to her client that evaluates options

for settlement. The letter refers to witness statements and crucial
documents, and offers legal opinions and impressions. She intends
to send it by e-mail to her client, but a phone call interrupts her. After
the phone call, she inadvertently clicks on “Reply to All” on a
previously stored e-mail, then realizes that she has sent all this
privileged and extremely important information to opposing counsel
as well as to her client. She attempts to unring this bell by motions to
retrieve the letter, bar its use as evidence and disqualify opposing
counsel.
2.

After weeks spent by attorneys and paralegals reviewing

thousands of documents to be produced to the opponent in complex
litigation, the producing side forwards privileged documents to
opposing counsel. Motion for return and for destruction of these
documents is filed.
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3.

In a document production of several thousand pages,

about three percent are labeled “Attorney-Client
Communication/Attorney Work Product,” followed by “Do not circulate
or duplicate,” and “Complete and return to SCIF Civil Litigation
Center.” Further, the word “confidential” is printed around the
perimeter of the first page of each of the privileged forms.
Nevertheless, these documents are sent to opposing counsel, who
insists on using them to support her client’s case. She argues that
modern usage of these confidentiality labels is so prevalent that they
do not alert strangers to the truly privileged nature of documents and
are practically meaningless.
4.

Opposing counsel conducts an electronic search of data

bases in a remote repository made available through discovery,
downloading them onto a CD-ROM. The CD includes not only
privileged documents, but also dozens of “deleted” privileged
documents. The privilege holder argues that the complexities of ediscovery make this error inevitable, and demands that the
documents must be returned or deleted, and that all reference to
them or material they reference, be barred from evidence.
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III. THE VARIETY OF COMMON SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Responding to ever increasing problems of inadvertent
disclosure, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility in 1992 outlined the three things an attorney receiving
her opponent's confidential4 and privileged5 information must do:
(1)

refrain from examining the document once the inadvertent
disclosure is discovered,6

(2)

notify the sending lawyer, and

(3)

abide by his or her instructions concerning the disposition
of the document.7

4

Cal. Evid. Code § 952 defines confidential communication as “information transmitted
between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence
by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the
consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted,
and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of
that relationship.”
5
See, Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 608 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted, 14
Cal. Rptr. 3d 210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) For purposes of this article, privileged information
includes information protected by the work product privilege. “An attorney’s notes
containing his impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories regarding a witness’
prior statement is absolutely immune from discovery . . .”
6
Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200-01 (W.D. Wash 2001) paralegal in plaintiff’s
firm viewed almost 1,000 privileged, potentially relevant e-mails contained in CD-ROM
disk. The court disqualified plaintiff’s firm, explaining it was“. . . necessary to remedy the
substantial taint placed on any future proceedings by the possession and review of the
disk.” The court held , “An attorney who receives privileged documents has an ethical
duty upon notice of the privileged nature of the documents to cease review of the
documents, notify the privilege holder, and return the documents. . . a failure by an
attorney to abide by these rules is grounds for disqualification . . .”
7
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 92-368 (1992); Sampson Fire
Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 362 (M.D. Pa. 2001). Fax cover sheet and one page
letter inadvertently sent to opponent. “ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
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Formal Op. 92-368 (1992), in this court’s opinion, heightens the level of civility and respect
among lawyers, and establishes a professional courtesy which is compatible with
vigorous advocacy and zealous representation. In this regard, information that is clearly
identified as confidential in nature or appears on its face to be subject to the attorneyclient privilege under circumstances that make it clear it was not intended for the receiving
lawyer, should not be examined. The receiving lawyer should immediately notify the
sending lawyer and abide by his instructions with respect to inadvertently disclosed
privileged material.” See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(B) (2000) requiring
only that receiving lawyer notify sender of receipt of privileged information;
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Shoot Out at the Not-O.K. Corral or Privileged Client
Communications – Lost and Found in Texas, 33 St. Mary’s L.J. 739, 745 (2002) “It is
important to note that this test [the ABA test] does not address what the receiving lawyer
is to do with the material in the interim. However, the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers does provide an answer to that issue. The Restatement holds that: If the person
whose information was disclosed is entitled to have it suppressed or excluded [(e.g., a
non-negligent inadvertent disclosure)], the receiving lawyer must either return the
information or hold it for disposition after appropriate notification to the opposing person
or that person’s counsel. A court may suppress material after an inadvertent disclosure
that did not amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege . . . Similarly, if the receiving
lawyer is aware that disclosure is being made in breach of trust by a lawyer or other agent
of the opposing person, the receiving lawyer must not accept the information.” Citing
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 cmt. m (1998).
State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 807 (Cal. App. 1999) “When a
lawyer who receives materials that obviously appear to be subject to an attorney-client
privilege or otherwise clearly appear to be confidential and privileged and where it is
reasonably apparent that the materials were provided or made available through
inadvertence, the lawyer receiving such materials should refrain from examining the
materials any more than is essential to ascertain if the materials are privileged, and shall
immediately notify the sender that he or she possesses material that appears to be
privileged.”
United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 175 (C.D. Cal. 2001) “. . . when
the court is in equipoise, a tie should be awarded to the privilege holder, at least when the
attorney-client is involved. See United States v. Mett, 178 F. 3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999)
stating that ‘where [the] attorney-client privilege is concerned, hard cases should be
resolved in favor of the privilege, not in favor of disclosure.’”
Holland v. Gordy Co., No. 231183, 2003 WL 1985800, at *10 (Mich. App. Apr. 29, 2003)
Court found that plaintiff’s counsel had committed ethical violations in reviewing
defendant’s litigation files and failing to notify defendant’s counsel of his possession of
the files. The trial court found that plaintiffs had committed a “clear absolute violation” of
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 when they examined and copied the documents without
notifying defendant’s counsel. The court further noted that “ABA Formal Opinion 92-368
may . . . be applicable because the ABA’s interpretations are binding on ABA members
and several of plaintiff’s counsel are members of the ABA. Citing Resolution Trust Corp.
v. First of America Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994), “. . . the district court noted
that even though there is an arguable conflict between Michigan’s interpretation of the
rules and the ABA’s interpretation, the ABA’s interpretations are binding on ABA
members.”; Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d) “Privilege Not Waived by Production. A party who
produces material or information without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not
waive that claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence if - - within ten days or a
shorter time ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers that such
production was made - - the producing party amends the response, identifying the

8

DOCSOAK-9729100.4-RHEAFEY

This ABA opinion seemingly relied on the belief that the value
of attorney-client confidentiality was superior to any other value
raised by the inadvertent disclosure waiver of confidential
information:8

material or information produced and stating the privilege asserted. If the producing party
thus amends the response to assert a privilege, the requesting party must promptly return
the specified material or information and any copies pending any ruling by the court
denying the privilege.”
Ken A. Zeidner, Inadvertent Disclosure of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the
Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1315, 1330 (2001), “The attorneyclient privilege presupposes that the privilege has not been waived. As owner of the
privilege the client has power to waive it; his attorney, however, acting as his agent, can
also waive the privilege on his behalf. Wavier has generally been defined as an
‘intentional relinquishment of . . . a known right.” This definition, however, applies to
constitutional rights; the attorney-client privilege is not guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. Therefore most courts do not regard intent as a disposition in determining
whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived. Waiver may be implied from a
party’s conduct that is inconsistent with a claim of the attorney-client privilege, such as
offensive use of the privilege, or breach of a communications confidentiality.”
John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – State Law,
51 ALR 5th 603, 663 (1997) “. . . some writers have suggested that waiver theory is the
wrong frame of analysis for the instant problem. It has been suggested that equitable
estoppel may be a better framework. Estoppel may arise even though there was no
intention on the part of the party estopped to relinquish or change any existing right. A
waiver ‘depends upon what one himself intends to do, without regard to its effect upon the
one claiming the waiver, whereas an estoppel depends rather on what the adversary is
induced to do.’ As an estoppel may arise from merely negligent conduct, and release of
privileged information to an opponent changes the opponent’s knowledge to some extent,
estoppel should be a viable alternative framework.”
United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 175 (C.D. Cal. 2001), see fn. 8
“Using the term ‘waiver’ to describe the consequences of the inadvertent production of
privileged documents is customary but misleading. Such a ‘waiver’ is not really a waiver
in the true sense, but is more accurately viewed as a ‘forfeiture’ designed ‘to punish the
person claiming the privilege for mistake.’” Citing Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128
F. 3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1997).
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d
210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) Where counsel, unfamiliar with privileged nature of the document
used in deposition, failed to object, the court stated that “waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a right with knowledge of the facts. The burden is on the party claiming
waiver to prove the existence of an intentional and knowing waiver.” Since opposing
counsel did not properly identify the document as a privilege work product document of
his opponent, failure to object at deposition was justified.”
8
Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators' Privilege in Innocents' Refuge: A New Approach To Joint
Defense Agreements, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1449, 1474 (2002), ". . . Scholars . . . [have
argued] that the privilege is justified, regardless of its cost, because it protects the privacy
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[T]he concept of confidentiality is a fundamental aspect
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel,” the
ABA opinion says. “As reflected in each iteration of the
Rules of Professional Responsibility, the obligation of
the lawyer to maintain and to refuse to divulge client
confidences is virtually absolute.9

of a socially valued relationship or because it would, be 'immoral for society to constrain
anyone from discovering what the limits of [the laws] power over him are.'"
See, Leibel v. General Motors Corp., 646 N.W. 2d 179, 186 (Mich. App. 2002)
Memorandum outlining problems encountered by GM in litigating seatback lawsuits,
discovered while plaintiffs were reviewing documents in defendant law firm’s document
repository. Memo discovered by at least three separate law firms reviewing depository
documents. Holding the document remained confidential, and adopting the strict
subjective test for discoverability, the court held: “. . . to constitute a valid waiver, there
must be an intentional, voluntary act or ‘true waiver.’ Thus, a document inadvertently
produced that is otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege remains protected . .
.”
9
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
See, Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of
Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 Emory
L.J. 1255, 1268 (1999).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), “The attorney-client privilege is
the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.
(citation omitted) Its purpose is to encourage the full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves the public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyers being fully informed by the client . . .”
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) calling the attorney-client
privilege one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.
See also, Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292 (D. Mass.
2000), criticizing two “rigid” approaches to whether inadvertently disclosed information
was waived. “. . . the ‘never waived’ approach, . . ., creates little incentive for attorneys to
guard privileged material closely and fails fully to recognize that even an inadvertent
disclosure undermines the confidentiality which undergirds the privilege. (citation
omitted) Likewise, while the strict accountability rule certainly holds attorneys and clients
accountable for their lack of care, it nonetheless diminishes the attorney-client
relationship because, in rendering all inadvertent disclosures - - no matter how slight or
justifiable - - waivers of the privileges, the rule further undermines the confidentiality of
communications. If, when a document stamped ‘attorney-client privilege’ is inadvertently
released, it and all related documents lose their privileged status, then clients will have a
much greater hesitancy to fully inform their attorney . . . ”
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(a) Confidentiality of Information “A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of client unless the client gives
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Expanding on this philosophical basis for its decision, the ABA
opinion went on to raise a practical issue that would not be addressed
simply by sanctioning the erring attorney: the unfair advantage gained
by an opponent receiving privileged information.10 What is worse, the

informed consent, that the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation . . .”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. [1] “This Rule governs the
disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the
lawyer’s representation of the client.” See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 for the
lawyer’s duties with respect to information provided to a lawyer by a prospective client;
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer’s duty not to reveal information
related to the lawyer’s prior representation of a former client; and Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.8(b) and R. 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer’s duty with respect to the use of such
information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients; Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. [2] almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to
determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be
legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 Scope of
Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer: [a] . . . a lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation . . . A
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities:
[4] . . . a lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to the representation of a
client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct . . ., [5] . . . a lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer shall demonstrate respect for the legal
system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and the public officials.
[8] . . . a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public
interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their communications will be private.”; Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.2 cmt. [2] “ . . Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a
lawyer and client might disagree and because of the actions in question may implicate the
interest of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such
disagreements are to be resolved. . .”]
10
Steven D. Glazer, Special Issues Relating To Third Party Liability For Trade Secret
Misappropriation, 719 P.L.I./PAT 39, 58 (2002), “. . . the U.S. Southern District of New York,
citing the ABA opinion [Opinion 92-368], sanctioned an attorney who opened a package
and read its contents after receiving a letter directing the attorney not to read, review, or
show anyone else the document because it was a privileged communication. [Citing
American Express v. Accu-Weather, Inc., No. 91 CIV 6485, 1996 WL 346388 (S.D. N.Y. Jun.
25, 1996)] Similarly, the Ethics Committee of the North Carolina State Bar suggested in a
formal opinion that lawyers who receive inadvertent disclosures from an opponent should
not examine the materials once it becomes obvious that the materials are confidential or
privileged and were not sent inadvertently, but should instead return the materials to the
sender.” Citing Ethics Comm. of North Carolina State Bar, RPC 252 (1997) Oregon State
Bar Ass’n Board of Governors, Formal Op. No. 1998-150 (1998) and Pennsylvania Bar
Ass’n Comm on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. No. 99-150 (1999).
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ABA opinion notes, using the privileged information would offend peer
standards of civility and possibly result in mistrials or disqualification
of counsel.
A decade later, the ABA backed down considerably from this
extreme position and offered Model Rule 4.4, which requires only that
the receiving attorney notify the sending attorney. 11

But cf., Diane Karpman, Unreported Decisions Offer Novel Concepts, 20 Cal. B. J., June
2003, at 23, “California follows ABA opinion 92-368 as to the duty of the receiver to notify
the sender of an inadvertent facsimile. . . . however, that highly controversial ABA opinion
was not based on ethic rules, lack citations, is inconsistent with the law governing waiver
of attorney-client privilege, and requires actions by the receiving attorney which directly
prejudice the rights of his or her client.”
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 614 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted, 14 Cal. Rptr.
3d 210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) Work product memorandum outlining discussion with counsel
expert, either stolen by plaintiff’s attorney or inadvertently delivered to him by court
reporter. “. . . we conclude that [plaintiff’s attorney], upon his discovery of [defense
counsel’s] notes, which were plainly privileged, should not have examined the document
any more than was necessary to determine that it was privileged, and should have notified
[defense counsel] immediately to avoid any potential prejudice.”
11

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(b) (2002) (ABA House of Delegates adopted Rule
4.4(b) on February 5, 2002); Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 441,
444 (2002) emphasizing the acknowledged fact that the model rules are not binding on
licensed attorneys until adopted by jurisdiction in which lawyer is admitted.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(b) lawyer who receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the
document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender; Model Rule of Prof’l
Conduct R 4.4 cmt. [1] “Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the
interest of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer
may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but
they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and
unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer
relationship”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4 cmt. [2] “Paragraph (b) recognizes that
lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by
opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such
a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify
the sender in order to permit the person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer
is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of
law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of
a document has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a
lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may
have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule,
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Between these two ABA pronouncements, and since the latest
one, numerous bar association ethical opinions12 and court cases13
“document” includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being
read or put into readable form. [emphasis added]]
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4 (2003) “Rule 4.4(b) addresses a lawyer’s receipt of
documents sent inadvertently; it does not address the receipt of documents of dubious
provenance. ABA Formal Ethics Op. 94-382 (1994) notes that from the receiving lawyer’s
point of view, the latter situation is distinguishable: ‘For example, the receiving lawyer
may have a legitimate claim that the documents should have been, but were not, produced
[in discovery.] Or the receiving lawyer may be able to assert that the documents were
receiving from somebody acting under the authority of a histle blowing statute.’ The
opinion concludes that the lawyer should review the material only to the extent necessary
to determine how to proceed, notify opposing counsel, and either abide by opposing
counsel’s instructions or refrain from using the material until a court rules on it . . .”
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(b) cmt.: [3] “Some lawyers may choose to return
the document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document
that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by
applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of
professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.”
12

1. “Alabama State Bar Office of General Counsel, Informal Op. of April 12, 1996
(following Opinion 92-368 in errant fact situation).
2. Board of Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn. Advisory Ethics Op. 92-A478 (1992) (same).
3. Connecticut Bar Informal Op. 95-4, 96-4 (1996) (citing Op. 92-368 in cases involving
duty to forward faxed documents to former partner of law practice and unauthorized
release of psychiatric records).
4. District of Columbia Bar Op. No. 256 (1995) (following Opinion 92-368 if recipient of
inadvertently disclosed information has not received the information).
5. Florida Bar Op. 93-3 (1994) (recipient of inadvertently misdelivered documents
must promptly notify sender).
6. Ill. St. Bar Ass’n. Il Adv. Op. 98-04 (1999) (counsel may use information if not
notified of inadvertent transmission, if notice of inadvertent transmission and before
review, should return materials without examination, counsel has duty to advise her client
that confidential information inadvertently transmitted.
7. Kentucky Bar Ass’n. Op. E-374 (revised) (1995) (lawyer who receives material
under circumstances in which it is clear that they were not intended for the receiving
lawyer should refrain from examining the materials, notify sender, and abide by sender’s
instructions regarding disposition of materials, but the lawyer who does use the material
is not subject to discipline).
8. Ky. Legal Ethics Comm. Op. E-374 (1995).
9. La. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Service and Ops., Synopsis 95-00069 (1995)
(where an attorney received documents from opposing attorney that are actually
privileged, the attorney should return the documents to opposing counsel.)
10. Maine Professional Ethics Comm. Op. No. 172 (3/7/00) “A lawyer clearly obligated
by decision or law to return a privileged document inadvertently made available to him by
opposing counsel must do so; failure to return a document would prejudice administration
of justice . . .”
11. Maryland Bar Ass’n Op. 2000-04 (notify sender and don’t use)
12. N.C. St. Bar. NC Eth. Op. RPC 253 (1997) (follows ABA opinion).
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13. New Hampshire Ethics Article (May 11, 1994) adopted ABA Formal Opinion 92-368.
14. N.Y. Cty. Law Ass’n Comm. Prof. Ethics Op. 730 (2002) (adopts ABA Opinion);
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Report.
15. Oregon State Bar Ass’n Board of Governors, Formal Op. 1998-150 (1998) (If the
receiving lawyer examines the document before the sending lawyer informs him that its
production was inadvertent, the receiving lawyer is still ethically obligated to return the
document under DR-1-102(A)(4).
16. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. Legal Ethics Prof’l Responsibility Ethics Op. 95-57 (1995)
(privilege not waived by inadvertent disclosure).
17. Pa. Ethics Op. 94-11B (1994) (inadvertent disclosure of work-product does not
constitute a waiver).
18. Pa. Ethics Op. 95-101A (1995) (adopting ABA Ethics Committee Opinion).
19. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. Legal Ethics Prof’l Responsibility Ethics Op. 99-150 (1999)
(tentatively approving ABA Opinion, but referencing ABA Ethics 2000 revision of rule 4.4).
20. Inadvertent Disclosures, Pa. Law Rep. No. 2000-200 (22-Oct Pa. Law. 59, 62 (2000)
“The waiver of the attorney-client privilege concerning privileged and confidential
materials is a matter for judicial determination; however, it is believed that, except in the
case of extreme carelessness or indifference, the inadvertent transmission of such
materials should not constitute a waiver of privilege.”
21. Utah State Bar Ethics Adv. Op. Comm. Op. No. 99-01 (January 29, 1999) (must
notify opposing counsel of receipt of confidential information).
22. Va. Op. 1702 (Nov. 24, 1997) (“It is not ethically permissible for a lawyer to keep
and use documents inadvertently transmitted to him by opposing counsel.”)
23. Va. Op. 1702 (Nov. 24, 1997) adopted ABA Formal Op. 94-382, holding the duty of
zealous representation did not require receiving lawyer to read or use information sent in
error.
13
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 613 (Cal. App. 2004), w granted, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d
210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a document summarizing a dialogue
between defense attorneys and defense experts. Document obtained either accidentally
through court reporter’s delivery to plaintiff’s counsel or memorandum was taken from
defense counsel’s files when counsel temporarily out of deposition room. “. . . an attorney
who inadvertently receives plainly privileged documents must refrain from examining the
materials any more than is necessary to determine that they are privileged, and must
immediately notify the sender, who may not necessarily be the opposing party, that he is
in possession of potentially privileged documents.” The court applied this rule to
confidential and privileged documents reflecting an attorney’s work product.
Samson Fire Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 361-362 (M.D. Pa. 2001), “After
weighing the cases from both sides, using the analysis set forth by Chief Judge Rambo in
the United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., [885 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Pa. 1994)], and
due to the unfortunate and continued lack of clarity by the courts, the American Bar
Association, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Local Bar Associations with respect to
the appropriate manner to handle inadvertent disclosure, this court believes that the best
procedure is that which has been set out by the American Bar Association in ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal op. 92-368 (1992).”
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 807 (Cal. App. 1999),
holding that an attorney receiving inadvertently sent privileged information should refrain
from examining the materials, notify the sender, and by agreement or resort to court,
determine the disposition of the materials and their contents. In so holding, the court
stated, “Although ABA Formal Opinions No. 92-368 is not controlling, its analysis has
provided us with guidance in the formulation of a standard for future application to
instances similar to that presented here.”
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have adopted the 1992 ABA opinion and required the receiving
attorney to stop, notify and follow instructions—in other words, to shut
his eyes and do what his opponent tells him to do. This is a tough
thing to ask of a zealous advocate, especially if the information is
outcome determinative.14.
Other bar association ethics opinions addressing the issue of
inadvertent disclosure as a matter of ethics have taken a conflicting
position.15 Courts looking at the same issue as a matter of law, and

14

Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And Legal
Ethics: An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska L. Rev. 461, 467 (2002), “It
is more difficult to criticize the strict responsibility approach [privilege always waived
once document disclosed] when one considers the fairness to both parties. On the one
hand, when the receiving party obtains a document, issues may open up that he or she
had not thought to pursue, or the document may provide the missing link of evidence
required to clinch the case. In such a scenario allowing the use of the document seems
fair, as perhaps it would lead to the most just result . . .”
Cf. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 183 (2001) adopting the “totality of the
circumstances approach” to the analysis of inadvertently produced confidential
information, the court commented “[t]he potential value of the inadvertently-produced
privileged documents to the receiving party is beside the point. Kansas City Power &
Light, 133 F.R.D. at 174 (indicating that the fact that inadvertently produced documents are
relevant, or even helpful to the receiving party, is not dispositive). The waiver
determination should not turn on whether the continued availability of the privileged
documents would benefit the receiving party, or to what extent . . . (citations omitted).”
15
For ethics opinion in support of partisan adversary approach, see
1.
Maryland Bar Ass'n Op. No. 89-53 (June 23, 1989) (lawyer may use document
obtained from unidentified source and is not required to notify court or opposing counsel,
but lawyer should keep copies to avoid destruction of evidence).
2.
State Bar of Alabama, Office of General Counsel, Informal Op. of April 8, 1996
(distinguishing inadvertent production in the course of routine document production from
an errant fax transmission and refusing to apply ABA Op. 92-368 in the former context).
Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the Privilege?
Exploring the Application of the Crime, Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 583 (2003), “. . . with the understanding of the value inherent in the
attorney-client privilege, is a commensurate understanding that this privilege, with the
costs is imposes on the judicial system, cannot be absolute.”
Some state bars have concluded that the receiving lawyer may use the materials, but she
should notify opposing counsel.
3.
Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Op. 93-11 (Dec. 3,
1993) (lawyer who obtains inadvertently disclosed privileged memorandum during the
course of public records search has no ethical duty to protect an opposing party's
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confidence and secrets by refraining from reading the memorandum, but the recipient
does have an ethical duty to notify the source and to provide opposing counsel with a
copy of the document upon request.
4.
Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1076 (May 17, 1988) (concluding that "'nothing in the Code of
Professional Responsibility would obligate a lawyer to return the materials or [prevent
him] from using the materials on [the] court's behalf, but out of professional courtesy, the
lawyer should inform the opposing counsel that he received the information.'" (See, Trina
Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and Law a Mistake; Using
Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 Emory L.J. 1255, fn 47
(1999)
5.
Philadelphia Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 94-3 (June 1994) (fax received by adversary
containing report of assessment of liability investigation, and value of claim. Report sent
inadvertently. [Referring to ABA Opinion Committee said "Opinion 92-368 does not
persuade the majority of this committee that failure to follow its guidelines is unethical
behavior. In some circumstances (not present here), it may be preferable to return a
requested document. It does not follow that failure to return such a document would be in
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.]
6.
Colo. Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 108 (2000) (receiving attorney's only obligation is
to notify sending lawyer).
7.
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Supreme Court of Ohio,
Ohio Adv. Op. 93-11 (1993) (". . . there is no ethical duty to refrain from reading the
memorandum or to refrain from revealing the contents to the client. Attorney has duty to
notify).”
8.
State Bar of Mich. Standing Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Mich.
Ethics Op. RI-179 (1993) (no ethical obligation to return documents).
9.
Philadelphia Bar Association Ethics Op. 94-3 (1994) (no need to return document.
ABA Opinion ". . . does not persuade the majority of this committee that failure to follow
its guidelines is unethical behavior."
10.
Phila. Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. 96-6 (1996) (“Opining that receiving counsel’s highest
duty is to his client and he therefore has no ethical obligation to return the privileged
document or even notify sending counsel of his mistake.”) (See Jonathan M. Redgrave,
Kristin M. Nimsger, Electronic Discovery and Inadvertent Production of Privileged
Documents, 49–Jul Fed. Law 37 fn. 8 (2002).)
11.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm. Ethics Op. 99-01 (1999) (only notice
of receipt required).
12.
Comm. on Ethics of the Md. State Bar Assoc. Ethics Docket 2000-04 (2000) (An
attorney receiving inadvertently produced materials has two alternatives: (1) return the
documents or (2) consult the courts).
13.
Fla. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 93-3 (1994) (An
attorney, upon realizing or reasonably believing that he has received a document or
documents that were inadvertently misdelivered, is ethically obligated to promptly notify
the sender of receipt of the documents.
14.
D.C. Bar Ethics Op. No. 256 (1995) Documents with no indicia of confidentiality or
privilege may be read and retained; D.C. Bar Ethics Op. No. 318 (Disclosure of privileged
material by third party (Dec. 2002).
15.
Inadvertent Disclosures, Pa. Law. Rep. No. 2000-200 [22 Oct Pa. Law. 59, 62 (2000)]
”3. In the absence of amendment to the rules or a formal opinion of this committee, the
issue of professional responsibility of a lawyer receiving by inadvertence any confidential
or privileged information from another lawyer, his client or other third person must, as
preamble to the rules indicates, ‘be resolved through the exercise of sensitive and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles of the rules.’ The decision of lawyer will depend
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applying standards of duty and predictability, have also taken
inconsistent approaches which fall roughly into three camps:
(1) The privilege is never waived unless the holder of the
privilege intends to waive it.16 This approach limits waiver to the
client’s intentional relinquishment of a known right.17

on lawyer’s view of his or her obligations to client under Rules 1.3 and 1.4, the nature of
information, how and from whom the information was received, attorney-client privilege
and work product rules, and, common sense, reciprocity and professional courtesy.”
[Committee went on to opine that the inadvertent transmission of materials should not
constitute a waiver of privilege.]
16.
State Bar of Mich. Op. CI-970 (1983) (Innocent attorney receiving privileged,
admissible, information may use it.)
17.
Colo. Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 108 (2000) (receiving attorney’s only obligation is
to notify sending lawyer).
18.
Board of Commissioners on grievances and discipline, Supreme Court of Ohio,
Ohio Adv. Op. 93-11 (1993) (“. . . there is no ethical duty to refrain from reading the
memorandum or to refrain from revealing the contents to the client. Attorney has duty to
notify.)
19.
State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Mich.
Ethics Op. Ri-179 (1993) (No ethical obligation to return documents.)
20.
Philadelphia Bar Ass’n Phila. Ethics Op. 94-3 (1994) (No need to return document.
ABA opinion “. . . does not persuade the majority of this committee but failure to follow its
guidelines is unethical behavior.”)
21.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Utah Ethics Op. 99-01 (1999) (only
notice of receipt required.)
16
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290 (D. Mass. 2000) “Some
courts follow the ‘never waived’ approach, which holds that a disclosure that was merely
negligent can never effect a waiver because, a fortiori, the holder of the privilege lacks a
substantive intent to forego protection. Citing, Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742
A.2d 933, 941-42 (Me. 1999), Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D.
Del. 1990), Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.
Neb. 1983); and Mendenhall v. Barbar-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982)”;
Corey v. Norman, Hanson & Detroy, 742 A. 2d 933, 941 (1999) “. . . Underlying this rule [the
Mendenhall rule that a truly inadvertent disclosure could not and does not constitute a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege] is the notion that the client holds the privilege, and
that only the client, or the client’s attorney acting with the client’s express authority, can
waive the privilege. . .”
17
See State Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 805 fn. 2
(Cal. App. 1999) In the body of the decision, the court held “Based on the language of
Evidence Code Section 912, we hold that ‘waiver’ does not include accidental, inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information by the attorney.” This California appellate court
seems to adopt the subjective waiver approach. “. . . Regardless of the approach used,
the final determination of whether an assertion of the attorney-client privilege will be
upheld in an inadvertent disclosure context depends on whether the client either
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(2) The privilege is always waived once the information is
disclosed.18 This view recognizes that one cannot unring a bell.19

expressly or impliedly waived the privilege.” Citing Ayres, Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases) 18 Pac. L. J. 59,
60-61 (1986).
Holland v. Gordy Co., No. 231183, 2003 WL 1985800 at *6 (Mich. App. Apr. 29 2003)
holding that “. . . at the very least, waiver through inadvertent disclosure requires a finding
of no intent to maintain confidentiality or circumstances evidencing a lack of such intent.
(citation omitted) ‘Thus a document inadvertently produced that is otherwise protected by
the attorney-client privilege remains protected.’ Accordingly, defendant’s alleged failure
to take reasonable precautions to protect the contents of box thirteen from disclosure is
not enough to find a ‘true waiver.’ Instead, the disclosure must have been an intentional,
voluntary act”; See fn. 4, one could argue that this approach is similar to that taken by
ABA Oop. 92-368.
18
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290-91 (D. Mass. 2000). “. .
. the ‘strict accountability’ rule . . . effects a waiver of the privilege regardless of the
privilege holder’s intent or inadvertence. See, e.g., Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V.,
160 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994); Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D.
445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); see also, Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(en banc); In Re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Int’l Digital Sys., the
court explained that ‘[w]hen confidentiality is lost through ‘inadvertent’ disclosure, the
court should not look at the intention of the disclosing party . . . It follows that the Court
should not examine the adequacy of the precautions taken to avoid ‘inadvertent’
disclosure either.’ (citation omitted) In reaching this conclusion, Magistrate Judge
Collings reasoned that there would be ‘little benefit’ in continuing to recognize a privilege
which has as its foundation the principle of confidentiality when that confidentiality has
already been breached. (citation omitted) In addition, the court pointed out that an
automatic waiver rule would best encourage attorneys to safeguard their confidences from
inadvertent disclosure.”
Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And Legal
Ethics: An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska Rev. 461, 464-465 (2002)
“Professionalism, under the strict responsibility approach, centers on tight control over
the litigation by the lawyer, and relinquishment of a client’s right if there is negligence in
handling privileged documents. The lawyer’s duty is first and foremost to her client, and
professionalism would mandate doing everything within the rules to further the interests
of the client. Generally, the professional lawyer does not have a duty to protect her
adversary from her own mistakes. . . . [Additionally] the strict responsibility approach
implies that fairness to the parties is in the open pursuit of justice, and that the narrower
the privilege, the greater the chance justice will be served. This approach embodies a
utilitarian philosophy that favors the search for truth over confidentiality . . .”
19
In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Pioneer
disclosed tax advice to SEC in a proxy statement. “. . . the disclosure of that advice and
reliance on that advice waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to all documents
which formed the basis for the advice, all documents considered by counsel in rendering
that advice, and all reasonably contemporaneous documents reflecting discussions by
counsel or others concerning that advice . . .”; Ray v. Cutter Laboratories Div. Of Miles,
Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Fla. 1990) insufficient precaution to protect the attorneyclient memorandum, as well as Florida strict waiver law required disclosure; Clagett v.
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(3) The privilege is waived only if the court determines that
disclosure resulted from gross negligence, not mere inadvertence.
Court following this theme generally examine the “totality of the
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent production,” including
efforts to avoid and correct the mistake.20

Commonwealth, 472 S.E. 2d 263, 270 (Va. 1996) “. . . the privilege is waived where the
communication takes place under circumstances such that persons outside the privilege
can overhear what is said . . .”
Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
“Even inadvertent communications to third parties, such as bystanders or eavesdroppers,
destroys the privilege. At least where the eavesdropping is not surreptitious and the
attorney and client have made little effort to ensure that they are not overheard,”
Cf., John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – State
Law, 51 A.L.R. 5th 603, at 668-69 (1997) “In some cases courts make it clear that they will
not impute another person’s inadvertence to the privilege holder, although those courts
might hold the privilege holder responsible for his own inadvertence, and so where the
release has been by someone other than the privilege holder, the following authorities
would support an argument that the releasor’s inadvertence should not be imputed to the
privilege holder.” (extensive citations omitted)
20
See, Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 291 (D. Mass. 2000);
Milford Power Ltd. Partnership v. New England Power Co., 896 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. Mass.
1995) (considering totality of circumstances surrounding the inadvertent production of
documents); “. . . Massachusetts, for example, adheres to ‘middle test’; See In Re
Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. Ltd., 681 N.E. 2d 838 (Mass. 1997) (“[A] client
may be deemed to have met the burden of establishing that a privilege exists and no
waiver has occurred if adequate steps have been taken to ensure a document’s
confidentiality.”) This approach empowers courts to consider a number of circumstances
relating to inadvertent production, including (1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the amount of time it took the producing party
to recognize its error, (3) the scope of the production, (4) the extent of the inadvertent
disclosure, and (5) the overriding interest of fairness and justice.
Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A. 2d 933, 940 (Me. 1999) Memorandum
summarizing telephone conference between counsel and client placed in boxes of
documents that were available to opposing counsel to photocopy. Memorandum was
labeled “confidential and legally privileged.” Court protected the privilege.
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IV. WEIGHING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST OTHER LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

For the client, the law is clear concerning inadvertently
disclosed privileged information. A client who voluntarily discloses
privileged information to his opponent waives the privilege even if
inadvertently;21 a client who receives his opponent’s inadvertently
disclosed confidential information is under no obligation to return it.22
Most authorities say an attorney must march to a different
drummer. An attorney who innocently receives privileged information

21

Hollingworth v. Time Warner Cable, No. C-030663, 2004 WL 1363847 at *11, (Ohio App.
2004) during a hearing before the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Commission, a Time
Warner supervisor inadvertently produced an e-mail from its human resources vice
president, damaging to its defense. It produced the same e-mail during subsequent
discovery requests. In holding the privilege waived, the court stated, “’[C]orporate
executives and managers, if endowed with appropriate authority by their employer, may
on behalf of the corporation either assert or waive the attorney-client privilege. {¶ 65} The
attorney-client privilege is waived where a client discloses communications with his or her
attorney to a third party. A client’s voluntary disclosure of privileged communications ‘is
inconsistent with an assertion of the attorney-client privilege.’ Such disclosure waives
any subsequent claim of privilege with regard to communications on the same subject
matter. [Citation omitted.] The ‘same subject matter’ standard is, however, to be applied
narrowly, rather than expansively,” Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor,
Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 129 (Cal. App. 2004) Corporate officers and lawyers
inadvertently failed to disconnect a conference call. Subsequent confidential
conversations were left on opponent’s voicemail. “. . . the fact that [corporate client]
Marvell did not intend to disclose the information to [opponent] is of no import . . . Marvell
was not coerced in any way to make the disclosure, and as such, its disclosure falls
squarely within the meaning of sections 912 subdivision (a) . . .” [Calif. Evid. Code 912(a),
the privilege may be waived, . . . (1) by the privilege holder making an uncoerced
disclosure of the information. . .”
22
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 30.8 at 30-13 (3rd ed.
2004) “. . . if the client is the recipient [of confidential information misdirected to him], it is
difficult to see any legal basis on which the client could be prevented from making use of
the information, . . . the consequences of the mistaken delivery can justly be left to rest on
the person who made the mistake.”
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-- even in response to a perfectly lawful request for unprivileged
information -- has additional obligations with respect to that
information simply because she is an attorney. Yet, such an attorney
may find herself in a dilemma that may threaten serious harm to her
client, and may even “require” her to violate professional duties to the
client, the court or third parties. Indeed, if she chooses the path
recommended by the ABA’s 1992 ethics opinion (no. 92-368), stop,
notify and follow, she is in effect incurring professional duties to the
opposing side to keep her adversary’s privileged information
confidential.23

23

See, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, “A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires a legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for representation”; Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 cmt. [5] : “. . . the required attention and preparation are determined
in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require
more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequences; Model
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client; cmt [1] . . . a lawyer must also act with commitment
and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s
behalf; cmt. [2] a lawyer’s workload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled
competently”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. “[15] a lawyer must act
competently to safeguard information relative to the representation of a client against
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are
participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s
supervision; [16] when transmitting a communication that includes information relating to
the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the
information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.”
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a)
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
8.3, “Reporting professional misconduct (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to a lawyer’s honesty, truthfulness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authorities.”
California Bus. & Prof. § 6068(e), A lawyer has a statutory duty to “maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve client secrets.”
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Suppose received privileged information reveals something the
receiving attorney has a professional duty to disclose to the court,
such as future wrongdoing by a party, counsel or witness.24 In those
cases, disclosure is required even if it means breaching the privilege
held by one’s own client, let alone the privilege held by an
opponent.25 There is no way to serve both obligations, counsel must
choose one to honor and one to breach.

24

Cf. Holland v. Gordy Co., No. 231183, 2003 WL 1985800 at *5 (Mich. App. Oct. 31, 2003)
Court denied applicability of the crime fraud exception when a plaintiff read defendant’s
litigation file that was clearly not intended for plaintiff’s review. Plaintiff claimed
entitlement to the litigation file on the basis of facts they discovered within that file. The
court stated “. . . the attorney-client privilege ceases to operate under this exception where
the advice from the attorney refers to future, not past, wrongdoing. In order for the crimefraud exception to apply, plaintiffs ‘must show that there is a reasonable basis to (1)
suspect the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime of fraud and (2) that the
communications were in furtherance thereof.’ (citation omitted) ‘This showing must be
made without reference to the allegedly privileged material.’”
Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F. 3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) noting that the attorney-client
privilege does not extend to communications in furtherance of a crime or fraud. United
States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (1989), “We hold that in camera review [of privileged
material] may be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client
communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. We further hold, however, that
before a district court may engage in in camera review at the request of the party opposing
the privilege, that party must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief
that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception’s applicability.
Finally, we hold that the threshold showing to obtain in camera review may be met by
using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be
privileged.
Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the Privilege?:
Exploring the Application of the Crime Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 16
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 583, 589 (2003) In Zolin, the United States Supreme Court put to rest
the issue of independent and admissible evidence by holding that the content of the
allegedly privileged communication may be used in determining the applicability of the
crime fraud exception, and the communication need not be competent or admissible
evidence . . .”
25
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(b)(c) “(b) A lawyer who represents a client in
adjudicative proceeding and who knows the person intends to engage, is engaging or has
engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceedings shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the Tribunal. . . . (c) The duties
stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply
even if compliance requires the disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
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In the example, judicial values (the need to prevent future
harm) trumps the normally absolute privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality. Yet, there is no obvious reason why it could not have
gone the other way.
A partisan, or client-centered, approach to receiving an
opponent’s confidential information acknowledges these conflicts and
hierarchies of values, and maintains that the adversary system and
the right to zealous representation are more important values than
protecting the “confidentiality” of inadvertently disclosed privileged
information.26 The partisan approach holds that the attorney-client
privilege is merely one of many important values that must be
weighed against each other in this situation, and that the privileged
information, once voluntarily disclosed, becomes part of the available
evidence in the case. 27

26

See Monroe Freedman, The Errant Fax, Legal Times, Jan. 23, 1995, at 26 for summary of
arguments in favor of partisan advocacy "approach to duty of lawyer receiving
inadvertently forwarded privileged information"; Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm on Legal Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 95-57 (1995) attaching Monroe Freedman’s article The
Errant Facts, Legal Times, January 23, 1995.
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d
210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) disqualifying attorney who had read and used opponent’s interview
notes of his expert witness.
27
Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators' Privilege in Innocents' Refuge: A New Approach To Joint
Defense Agreements, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1449, 1476-77 (2002); see also, ". . . The
privilege may exist to induce frank communications from client to attorney, but the
limitation imposed by the confidentiality requirement is a recognition of the costs of the
privilege in depriving the fact finder of highly relevant evidence. The confidentiality
requirement is intended to restrict the scope of communications shielded by the attorneyclient privilege to those that would not have occurred but for the existence of the privilege.
If a client is willing to communicate in the presence of a third party who may be
questioned in a legal proceeding, then he cannot be said to have relied upon the privilege
in communicating with an attorney; and if the client, after the fact, discloses the substance
of the communication to a third party, this 'constitutes good evidence that the privilege
was unnecessary to induce the communications to the attorney,'" Id. at fn. 96 "a . . .
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justification for the confidentiality requirement, . . . is that it works as a protection against
the use of the attorney-client privilege as both a sword and a shield. As courts have often
noted, the '[s]elective disclosure [of privileged information] for tactical purposes waives
the privilege.'" United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) Selective
disclosure can occur in two ways: first, a disclosure to selected persons; and second, a
disclosure of selected materials. The confidentiality requirement to the attorney-client
privilege is designed to prevent both. Thus, a party cannot disclose privileged documents
to certain individuals and then turn around and claim the privilege against other
individuals. Nor can a party reveal certain privileged documents with respect to a subject
matter but then refuse to produce other documents pertaining to the same subject matter.
F.C. Cycles Int’t, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A.,184 F.R.D. 64, 79 (D. Md. 1998) The court cited
with approval Dupan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.C.S.C.
1975), “A waiver of the privilege as to all communications ordinarily follows from the
voluntary waiver even if made with limitations of one or more similar communications.
Thus, if a client, through his attorney, voluntarily waives certain communications, but
guarded with a specific written or oral assertion at the time of the waiver that it is not its
intention to waiver the privilege as to the remainder of all similar communications, the
privilege, as to the remaining undisclosed communications, is nevertheless waived.” See
Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine 163 (3d
ed. 1997); see also, 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence and Trial at Common Law § 2291
(1961) "Its [privilege of confidentiality] benefits are all indirect and speculative; its
obstruction is plain and concrete . . . it is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy,
but it is nevertheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Defending White Collar Crime
By Kenneth Mann. New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1985. 95 Yale L.J.
1523, 1527 (1986). “The morality of a seriously moral person includes concern for the
truth of the matter in things of consequence. The advocate, however, must be concerned
with presenting to others of evidence that will be taken as the equivalent of truth. Every
trial advocate who is a seriously moral person has to be concerned with this ambiguity . . .
as Dr. Mann says: ‘The second goal, which can exist only in conjunction with the first, is
to keep the client from communicating too much information to the attorney, information
that would interfere with his building a strong defense.’ Lawyers do not commonly
acknowledge that they do not wish always to gather all relevant information concerning a
client’s matter. To acknowledge that avoiding certain information may be a goal in the
attorney-client relationship contradicts the premises of the adversary system and the
conventional theory of the attorney-client privilege. Whoever heard of the attorney-client
privilege being justified on the ground that it allows the lawyer merely to gather some
information about the client? . . .”
Scott v. Glickman, 199 F.R.D. 174, 180 (E.D.N.C. 2001) holding careless efforts to protect
privileged document justified privilege waiver. Commenting on the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege the court stated, “. . . since the attorney-client privilege impedes
the full and free discovery of the truth, it needs to be narrowly construed, it is not unfair to
allow the truth to be made public once inadvertently disclosed. Nor would it be fair to
reward carelessness.”
Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And Legal Ethics:
An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska L. Rev. 461, 464 (2002) “. . . some
commentators believe that ‘the priorities underlying the traditional confidentiality rationale
are perverse’ because they categorically favor clients who withhold information out of
irresponsible or guilty motives at the expense of innocent third parties.” [Quoting
Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics By The Pervasive Method, 225, 227
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Supporting this view by inference in another context, Associate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has suggested (in her dissent in
Swindler & Berlin, et al. v. United States28) that the privilege of
confidentiality is not absolute, as suggested by the 1992 ABA
Opinion, and must be narrowly construed:
"In light of the heavy burden that they place
on the search for truth (citation omitted),
'[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not
favored, and even those rooted in the
Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances.' (citation omitted).
Consequently we construe the scope of
privileges narrowly (citation omitted). We are
reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an
existing one expansively unless to do so will
serve a 'public good' transcending the
normally predominate principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth.’"
Chief among the values that might outweigh the privilege,
according to Justice O’Connor, are fairness and the pursuit of truth:
". . . When the privilege is asserted in the
criminal context, and a showing is made that
the communications at issue contain
necessary factual information not otherwise
available, courts should be permitted to
assess whether interests in fairness and
accuracy outweigh the justifications for the

(2nd ed. 1998) (Quoting William Simon, Ethical Discretion In Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1083, 1142 (1988)) “In other words, a preference for confidentiality benefits those clients
who conceal information as to their guilt of culpability, and harms those who are forthright
with their information . . .;”

25

DOCSOAK-9729100.4-RHEAFEY

privilege. . . . A number of exceptions to the
privilege already qualify its protections, and an
attorney 'who tells his client that the expected
communications are absolutely and forever
privileged is oversimplifying a bit.'"29
Indeed, as Justice O’Connor makes clear, the attorney-client
privilege is not absolute, for there are many recognized exceptions,
each of which trumps the privilege: where the client intends to use the
attorney's services to commit a crime or fraud;30 where the
29

Swidler, 524 U.S. at 411, 413
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . .”
Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 128 (Cal.
App. 2004) Failing to disconnect a conference call, a lawyer and three officers of
defendant Marvell continued to discuss details of purchase of plaintiff’s technology. This
conversation was recorded, inadvertently, on plaintiff’s voicemail. Court ruled that when
client inadvertently discloses privileged information, the privilege is waived, and
additionally held that if inferences of both a crime or fraud [theft of trade secrets and
unlawful hiring] are discernable in the communication and a reasonable relationship
between that crime or fraud and the attorney’s communication could be drawn, the
privileged nature of the communication is waived and it may be used as evidence during a
trial.
Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 186 (C.D. Cal. 2001) quoting In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 87 F. 3d at 381-382, “’A communication between client and attorney can be in
furtherance of the client’s criminal conduct if the attorney does nothing after the
communication to assist the client’s commission of a crime, and even though
communication turns out not to help (and perhaps even to hinder) the client’s completion
of a crime.’” (interior quotes omitted)
In re Public Defender’s Service, 831 A. 2d 890, 901 (D.C. App. 2003) “. . . the justification
for the privilege [attorney-client privilege] evaporates when the attorney-client
communication works to further a fraud instead of to prevent one . . .”
Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D.
46, 52-53 (M.D.N.C. 1987), where court analyzed plaintiff’s claim that the inadvertently
produced privileged information was discoverable pursuant to the crime-fraud exception
to the privilege. “Plaintiff . . . alleged that the Roberts letter is not privileged because it is
subject to the crime and fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Communications
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege lose their protection if the lawyer is
consulted in furtherance of a continuing and contemplated crime, fraud, or other
misconduct. (citations omitted) Court have extended coverage of this exception to the
attorney-client privilege beyond instances of fraudulent or illegal conduct and have
applied it to business litigation such as patent, antitrust, security matters, and it may even
extend to non-business torts . . .”
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989) “. . . the attorney-client privilege
must necessarily protect the confidences of wrongdoers but the reason for that protection
30
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confidential communications threaten imminent or reasonably certain
death or substantially bodily harm;31 where the client intends to offer
false evidence before a tribunal;32 and where the privileged
information is necessary to protect a lawyer or defend her against
charges of malpractice, ineffective assistance of counsel or charges
of excessive fees.33

– the centrality of open client and attorney communication to the proper functioning of our
adversary system of justice - - ‘ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely, where the
desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoings, but to future wrongdoings’ (citation
omitted). It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney privilege to assure
that the ‘seal of security,’ between lawyer and client does not extend to the
communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud’ or
crime.”
31
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.6(b)(1).
32
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 3.3(a)(1).
33
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.6(b)(5) A lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . (5)
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client. (Adopted Aug. 2003)
Additionally, the trend is to add further exceptions watering down the confidentiality
privilege. The ABA amended Model Rule 1.6 to permit a lawyer to reveal a client’s
confidential information. See, 1.6(b)(2), effective August 2003, lawyer may reveal
information to, prevent client from committing a crime or fraud that will cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of another; 1.6(b)(3) to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial financial injury or property damage caused by client crime or fraud
when services of her lawyer are used; 1.13 (c)(1)(2), except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and
appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law; and (2)
the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization; George J. Terwilliker III, Privileged in Jeopardy, Nat’l
L. J., Feb. 9, 2004 at 17 “It (the January 2003 Department of Justice memorandum referred
to as the ‘Thompson memorandum’) encourages prosecutors who are considering
charging a corporation to evaluate cooperation by looking to the corporation’s willingness
‘to disclose the complete results of its internal investigation, and to waive attorney-client
and work product protection’ that would otherwise obtain with respect to relevant
communications, reports or other information. As a result, corporations are being
pressured to provide otherwise privileged reports, memoranda and records of advice from
counsel as a price of trying to avoid prosecution or mitigate penalties.” In re: the
Investigation of the Death of Eric Dewayne Miller, 584 S.E. 2d 772 (N.C. 2003) holding, on
facts almost identical to Swindler and Berlin, et al. v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)
that statements made by client to his attorney, prior to client’s death, could be reviewed in
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V. CONFLICTING DUTIES CREATE AN ETHICAL DILEMMA
Because the attorney-client privilege is not absolute, as
maintained by the ABA Opinion, but rather must be balanced against
other social interests, it is fair to ask additional questions. For
example, who is charged with protecting the privilege?34 There is no
ambiguity in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: a client's
attorney is charged with protecting client's confidences and privileged
communications.35 This is based on her duties of competence and

camera to determine if statements related to a third party’s interest, not harming the
client’s interest; 17 C.F.R. 205 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC regulations allowing
attorneys to reveal confidential information relating to violations of SEC regulations.
Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyers Pressed To Give Up Ground On Client Secrets, The New
York Times, Aug. 11, 2003 at “Earlier this year, the SEC adopted a rule requiring lawyers to
report potential fraud to corporate boards and this fall it may well propose additional
rules; the Federal Trade Commission has filed suit to force law firms to comply with a 1999
law on disclosing privacy policies to clients; the internal revenue service is trying to make
law firms disclose which clients bought questionable tax shelters, and the justice
department, which has already said that conversations between lawyer and terrorist
suspects are subject to eavesdropping, is also pressing corporate defendants harder to
waive their confidentiality privilege in order to avoid prosecution.”
34
Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
“Even inadvertent communications to third parties, such as bystanders or eavesdroppers,
destroys the privilege. At least where the eavesdropping is not surreptitious and the
attorney and client have made little effort to ensure that they are not overheard,”
35
In re Sealed Case, 877 F. 2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) Confidential memorandum was
disclosed to a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Company characterized such
inadvertent disclosure as “bureaucratic air.” In holding that the privilege was waived, the
court commented “. . . normally the amount of care taken to ensure confidentiality reflects
the importance of that confidentiality to the holder of the privilege. To hold, as we do, that
an inadvertent disclosure will waive the privilege imposes a self-governing restraint on the
freedom with which organizations such as corporations, unions and like label documents
relating to communications with counsel as privilege. To readily do so creates a greater
risk of ‘inadvertent’ disclosure by someone and thereby the danger that the ‘waiver’ will
extend to all related matters, perhaps causing grave injury to the organization. But this is
as it should be. Otherwise, there is a temptation to seek artificially to expand the content
of privilege matter. In other words, if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat
the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels – if not crown jewels . . .”
See also, F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 144 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992)
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 9.9, at 9-34 (2004 Supp.). “A
significant measure of a lawyer’s duties of loyalty and zealous representation is the corelative duty to maintain client confidences and to assert the attorney-client privilege
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diligence, and on the rules expressly protecting the confidentiality
between attorney and her client.
Not so for those who would apply the 1992 ABA ethics opinion
guideline, which charges an attorney with the additional responsibility
of protecting the privilege of her opponent’s client against that client’s
attorney’s inadvertent disclosure of privileged material. This is a duty
far greater than any elucidated in the applicable Rules of Professional
Conduct. 36
A.

Burden On Receiving Attorney: Disqualification
This “extra” duty is especially onerous when one considers that

the sanction for its breach might be to disqualify the innocent
receiving attorney from the case.37 Think of that: Because of the
almost as a matter of instinct whenever it might be arguably applied; see §9.7. For the
same reason, lawyers should guard against waiver of the privilege with the same
vigilance. Not only should the lawyer avoid waiver by failure to assert the privileged when
either the lawyer or the client is interrogated, as just noted, but the lawyer should also
warn the client about the dangers of inadvertent waiver and assist the client in taking
reasonable precautions to prevent it . . .”
Cf., John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – State
Law, 51 A.L.R. 5th 603, 668-69 (1997) “In some cases courts make it clear that they will
not impute another person’s inadvertence to the privilege holder, although those courts
might hold the privilege holder responsible for his own inadvertence, and so where the
release has been by someone other than the privilege holder, the following authorities
would support an argument that the releasor’s inadvertence should not be imputed to the
privilege holder.” (extensive citations omitted)
Alexander v. F.B.I., 198 F.R.D. 306, 315-16 (D.D.C. 2000). Lower level corporate employee
disclosed confidential information generated by corporate counsel to third parties.
Holding against waiver, court held that the waiver authority presided only in corporate
management.
36
Supra note 9.
37
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d
210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) holding that an attorney who used an opponent’s work product
memorandum outlining conference with his designated expert obtained accidentally
through a court reporter, or intentionally from the opponent’s files during a recess of a
deposition, should be disqualified, along with the expert who forwarded the information by
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other side’s inadvertence, the receiving attorney is disqualified,
forfeiting fees, and the innocent client is deprived of her choice of
counsel,38 and forced to bear the cost of a new attorney’s learning
curve.39

the receiving attorney. In so holding the court stated “. . . the record shows that Johnson
not only failed to conduct himself as required under the State Fund [fn. 24]case but also
acted unethically in making full use of the confidential document, the liability issues
hinged on the technical evidence and the expert’s opinions based on the evidence.
Johnson’s use of the document to undermine the defense expert’s opinion placed
defendants at a great disadvantage. . . .as the [trial] court found, the damage could not
have been undone.”
See, E. Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1309 (W.D. Wash. 2001) The disclosure “of
privileged information cannot be undone in these circumstances. Therefore the court
finds that the only remedy to mitigate the effects [plaintiff’s counsel] eleven month
possession and review of the disk is disqualification.”
General Accident Insurance Company v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation, 483 So.
2d 505, 506 (Fla. App. 1986). General Accident forwarded its claims file to the court for in
camera inspection. Trial inadvertently forwarded the file to David J. Palgon, counsel for
the insured. Not realizing the file had been sent to him inadvertently, Palgon reviewed the
file and discussed it with counsel for Borg-Watner. Court held; “. . . while recognizing
disqualification of a party’s chosen counsel is an extraordinary remedy and should be
resorted to sparingly, [citation omitted], we believe the prudent course in this case is to
disqualify counsel. Like so many other ethical considerations in the practice of law,
perceptions are of the utmost importance. Thus, how much of an advantage, if any, one
party may gain over another we cannot measure. However, the possibility that such an
advantage did occur warrants resort to this drastic remedy for the sake of appearance of
justice, if not justice itself, and the public’s interest in the integrity of the judicial process.”
38

Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Solutions, Inc., No. 4D04-224, 2004 WL 1496903 at *1 (Fla.
App. July 7, 2004) General counsel for Tandem filed a whistleblower lawsuit against
former employer. Tandem filed motion to disqualify general counsel’s counsel contending
that he had received attorney-client privileged information that gave him a tactical
advantage. Denying the motion on the grounds that general counsel had the discretion to
disclose privileged information as part of a claim or defense, the court commented;
“’Disqualification of a party’s chosen counsel is an extraordinary remedy and should only
be resorted to sparingly.’ (citation omitted) Motions for disqualifications are generally
viewed with skepticism because disqualification of counsel impinges on a party’s right to
employ a lawyer of choice, and such motions are often interposed for tactical purposes.
(citation omitted) Confronted with a motion to disqualify, a court must be sensitive to the
impeding interest of requiring an attorney’s professional conduct and preserving client
confidences and, on the other hand, permitting a party to hire the counsel of choice.”
Kusch v. Ballard, 645 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. App. 1994) criticizing a disqualification
order by the trial court. “ . . . put simply, one side’s lawyer has negligently transmitted a
fax communication to the other side’s lawyer containing information that has nothing to
do with the substance of the dispute but is tactically advantageous to the receiving
lawyer’s client. The trial court has remedied the situation by disqualifying the entirely
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Even in jurisdictions applying the “totality of circumstances” test
the receiving attorney is not necessarily safe from disqualification.
Indeed, such an attorney faces a harsh Catch-22. On the one hand,
one of the “circumstances” considered by the courts is whether the
receiving attorney has relied upon the confidential information and
changed positions as a result. If so, a finding of waiver by the other
side is more likely.40 On the other hand, some courts have held that
innocent receiving lawyer. For doing what? Reading his fax mail? Why must the
receiving lawyer’s client lose his entirely permissible choice of lawyer because of the
neglect (or, perhaps, purposeful act) of the adversary’s lawyer? I therefore entirely agree
with Judge Glickstein in vacating the order disqualifying the receiving lawyer.”
39
See, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
Acknowledging that mere receipt of inadvertently sent confidential information is not a
violation of a lawyer’s professional responsibility, but cautioning that “. . . lawyers should
be aware that the receipt and/or initial review of such materials, in certain circumstances,
may be the basis for a motion disqualifying the lawyer from continuing to represent its
client in the matter at issue . . . a lawyer complying with the procedures outlined above
may nevertheless be unjustifiably accused of reviewing the received materials before
giving his or her adversary an adequate opportunity to seek appropriate protection from
the courts. A court confronted with such allegations on a motion to disqualify may err on
the side of caution – by granting the motion – in order to preserve inviolate the attorneyclient privileged and in light of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to avoid the appearance of
impropriety.
Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 617 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted 14 Cal. Rptr.
3d 210 (Cal. June 9, 2004) recognizing the serious effects of the court’s disqualification of
receiving attorney’s use of confidential information, stated “Plaintiffs themselves have
done nothing to cause the disqualification. In accordance with the trial court’s order,
plaintiff must be given ample opportunity to retain new counsel and experts, who in turn
should be afforded every opportunity to complete discovery and prepare for trial.”
State Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 808 (Cal. App.
1999), recognizing the danger of an opponent intentionally sending confidential
information to disqualify the receiving attorney. The court held “’. . . mere exposure to the
confidences of an adversary does not, standing alone, warrant disqualification. Protecting
the integrity of the judicial proceeding does not require so draconian a rule. Such a rule
would nullify a party’s right to representation by chosen counsel anytime inadvertence or
devious design put an adversary’s confidences in an attorney’s mailbox. Nevertheless, we
consider the means and sources of breaches of attorney-client confidentiality to be
important considerations.’ (citation omitted) Having so noted, . . . we do not rule out the
possibility that in an appropriate case, disqualification might be justified if an attorney
inadvertently receives confidential materials and fails to conduct himself or herself in the
manner specified above, assuming other factors compel disqualification.”
40
F.C. Cycles Intern., Inc. v. Fila Sport S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 78-79 (D. Md. 1998) “Whether
fundamental fairness weighs for or against waiver largely depends on the extent of the
reliance the party has made on the document, in its case. See, e.g. Kansas City Power &
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disqualification of a receiving attorney is appropriate where the
volunteered privileged information affected the behavior of the
receiving attorney.41 Thus, an attorney who considers or acts upon
the received information cannot predict whether she will be rewarded
with a ruling of waiver or slapped with a disqualification order.
It’s a short step from here to the crafty opponent who
intentionally includes privileged information within transmitted
Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coalmining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Kan. 1989)
(Fairness weighed in favor of finding non-waiver when the defendant failed to demonstrate
that it had relied significantly on the documents inadvertently disclosed by the plaintiff. . .
) Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Fairness requires a
finding of waiver because the defendant had analyzed the inadvertently produced
privileged document, had possibly disclosed it to experts, and had shown a strong
reliance on it for purposes of the defense”; F.C. Cycles Intern., Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A.,
184 F.R.D. 64, 78 (D. Md. 1998) In finding subject matter waiver, the court held “. . . the
plaintiff has significantly relied upon the disclosed document. It has been used in several
depositions and addresses issues that are at the heart of the claim. Thus the weight of
this factor supports waiver.”
United States v. J. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733, 741 (2003) finding no waiver but
reciting the general rule “generally, courts hold that fairness dictates finding of wavier in
cases where the privileged information at issues has been widely disseminated . . .”
41
Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2001) involving the receipt of
almost a thousand privileged documents. “In determining when to exercise its discretion
to disqualify counsel in those cases involving the loss of the protection of privilege, ‘the
court should resolve any doubts in favor of disqualification.’” (citations omitted) In the
instant case, although [plaintiff’s counsel] has gone to great lengths and argued stridently
that no confidences were revealed to or used by the firm, the undisputed facts of the case
create a substantial taint on any future proceedings. Simply returning the Disk and
removing the possibility of any future impingement on [defendants] attorney-client
privilege will not remove the taint. “A reasonable member of the bar or the public would
share . . . the nagging suspicion that plaintiff’s trial preparation and presentation of their
case had benefited from confidential information obtained from [the Disk].”
In Re Meador, 968 S.W. 2d 346, 351-52 (Tex. 1998) involving receipt of confidential
information outside the normal course of discovery. The court set up six factors to
consider when deciding the disqualification issue. “1) Whether the attorney knew or
should have known the material was privileged; 2) the promptness with which the attorney
notifies the opposing side that he or she has received its privileged information; 3) the
extent to which the attorney reviews and digests the privileged information; 4) the
significance of the privileged information; i.e., the extent to which its disclosure may
prejudice the movant’s claim or defense, and the extent to which return of the documents
will mitigate that prejudice; 5) the extent to which movant may be at fault for the
unauthorized disclosure; 6) the extent to which the nonmovant will suffer prejudice from
the disqualification of his or her attorney.”
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material and then seeks to disqualify a feared attorney who used it to
his client’s benefit.42
If one ignores this particular “Catch-22,” and further analyzes
the theoretical underpinnings of the 1992 ABA opinion, one discovers
conflicts with ethical duties other than those of zealous advocacy.
For example, if the privileged information inadvertently produced
shows that the opponent was guilty of discovery abuse, perhaps by
disclosing names of witnesses whose identities were improperly
withheld, the receiving attorney may have an affirmative duty to use
it,43 indeed, if not a duty to tell the court about the discovery violation
and to seek sanctions.

42

See, State Compensation Insurance Fund v. W.P.S., Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 808 (Cal.
App. 1999) following ABA opinion 92-368, “We note that whenever a lawyer seeks to hold
another lawyer accountable for misuse of inadvertently received confidential materials, the
burden must rest on the complaining lawyer to persuasively demonstrate inadvertence.
Otherwise, a lawyer might attempt to gain an advantage over his or her opponent by
intentionally sending confidential materials and then bringing a motion to disqualify the
receiving lawyer. . .”
43
See, ABA Comm. on Ethics Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
Considering the situation where lawyers sent, by a person not authorized to offer them,
materials of an adverse party that the lawyer knows to be, or appears to be on their face,
subject to the attorney-client privilege. Acknowledging a general duty corresponding to
ABA Formal Op. 92-368, the Committee acknowledged that “. . . the sender may be seeking
to rectify improper or unjust conduct – for example, the failure to disclose such
documents in response to a production request clearly calling for them. In such instance,
although the sender has no authority to make the disclosure, the receiving attorney may
be entitled to use them.”
Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. No. 99-150 (Pa. Bar Assn. Comm. Leg.
Eth. Prof. Resp.) “. . . in certain circumstances, the law may recognize some right to the
use of the materials despite the fact that the sender had no authority to transmit them. For
example, the receiving lawyer may have a legitimate claim that the documents should have
been, but were not, produced by an adverse party in response to pending discovery
requests. See, In Re Shell Oil Refinery, No. Civ. A. 88-1935, 1992 WL 275426 (E.D. La. Sept.
29, 1992) (ordering that such documents not be used by receiving party unless they ‘were
the subject of a proper discovery request and were improperly withheld’ by adverse
parties). Or the receiving lawyer may be able to assert that the documents were received
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Suppose the disclosed information indicates that the
adversary's client intends to commit perjury during deposition.44
Should the deposing attorney counsel the deponent not to commit
perjury? (And if so, must the deposing attorney first get permission to
talk to his adversary’s client, in light of Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct
Rule 4.2, which says a lawyer should not communicate with a
represented person?45) If the deponent does commit perjury, can the
deposing attorney report the perjury to the court if the client’s lawyer
fails to?46

from someone acting under the authority of a whistleblowing statute. See, e.g.,
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 USC & 1201 et seq. (1988).”
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 865, 866
(Cal. App. 1993) Aerojet’s risk manager forwarded memorandum revealing the existence
of a witness to plaintiff’s counsel. Memorandum was on plain paper “to: Aerojet File,
From: LRAC,” in holding plaintiff’s counsel had the right to depose the witness and call
him as a witness at trial, the court stated “. . . whether the existence and identity of a
witness or other non-privileged information is revealed through formal discovery or
inadvertence, the end result is the same: the opposing party is entitled to the use of that
witness or information . . . If respondents either deliberately or negligently fail to disclose
the existence of a relevant witness in response to discovery requests, they would hardly
be in a position to take advantage of their conduct if that information was subsequently
inadvertently disclosed . . .”; but see, Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 613 (Cal.
App. 2004) severely limiting the holding in Aerojet. “ While unnecessarily broad in its
holding, Aerojet was right in its narrow application. In regards to its application, the case
essentially involved nonprivileged information, namely, a witness’ identity, which was
never used to the other party’s detriment. . .”
44
See, Lawrence J. Fox, Your Client’s Employee Is Being Deposed: Are You Ethically
Prepared? 29 Litigation 17, 23 (2003) “. . . it is also possible that counsel at the deposition
will be confronted by a lying witness (not his client) and believe that he or she has some
obligation to act under Rule 3.3. In that unlikely event, however, the lawyer will not have to
act at deposition and will have to act thereafter only if the witness and the witness’s
lawyer fail to take appropriate remedial action.”
45
See, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2, Communication With Person Represented
By Counsel.
46
See, New York State Bar Ass’n Topic: Confidentiality; Unauthorized Disclosure; Fraud
On Tribunal, Op. No. 700 1998 WL 957912 (N.Y. St. Bar. Assn. Comm. Prof. Eth. 1998)
Attorney contacted by unsolicited phone call by former employee of adversary informing
him that documents were altered prior to their submission during discovery. Ethics
Committee recommended that attorney refrain from exploiting the willingness of the
adversary’s former employee to breach the duty of confidentiality, and to seek judicial
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guidance regarding its use. The Committee opined that “. . . the attorney here has
received information that suggests possible criminal activity or fraud in which opposing
counsel may be assisting. There are no documents that can be returned to counsel, and
the attorney’s duties to the tribunal may require disclosure. See DR 7-102 (B)(2) (“A
lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [a] person other than the
client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the
tribunal”). There is little question here that the information conveyed to the attorney by
the former employee of the respondent’s law firm, if true, would constitute fraud that must
be revealed to the tribunal under DR 7-102 (B)(2). In such circumstances, we believe it
would be appropriate for the attorney, on notice to opposing counsel, to notify the hearing
officer presiding over the proceeding of the allegation. Such a course will satisfy the
attorney’s possible ethical duties under DR 7-102 (B)(2) and will also allow the tribunal to
address the legal issues (such as applicability of crime-fraud exception, and whether the
actions of the former employee constitute a civil or criminal wrong) effecting the receiving
lawyer’s ability to use a communication and any evidence derived therefrom . . . the
inquirer may, however, bring the allegation of document alteration to the attention of
another court or other appropriate authority (such as a law enforcement agency or
disciplinary authority) on an ex parte basis if the attorney reasonably concludes that it
would not be appropriate to notify opposing counsel in the first instance . . .”
F.C. Cycles Intern., Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 80 (D. Md. 1999) “A party may
compel production of allegedly privileged communications upon a prima facie showing
that the lawyer’s advice was designed to serve his client in the commission of a fraud,
crime, or tort (citation omitted) . . .”
Df. Kathleen Maher, Don’t Fax, Don’t Tell: Differing Opinions About ABA Opinions 92-368
and 94-382, 12 No. 4 Prof. Law 2 (2001) “Two years after issuing Formal Opinion 92-368,
the ABA Standing Committee addressed the ethical obligation of a lawyer who receives an
adverse party’s privileged and/or confidential materials not as a result of opposing
counsel’s inadvertent disclosure, but rather, from someone not authorized to provide
them. According to Formal Opinion 94-382, [1994] the receiving lawyer should either
refrain from reviewing the materials or only review them to the extent necessary to
determine how to proceed. The lawyer should also notify the opposing counsel and either
follow opposing counsel’s instructions with respect to the disposition of the materials, or
refrain from using materials until there is a definitive court ruling on the proper disposition
of the materials;”
Steve Morris, Ethical Conflicts Facing Litigators, SH009 ALI-ABA 449 (2002) Information
obtained by questionable means: “Receiving proprietary documents ‘leaked’ by an
adversary’s employee has been held to be ‘inappropriate and contrary to fair play’ without
regard to the relevance of information in the materials. Accepting purloined proprietary
information is ‘more than informal fact gathering.’ This activity is ethically condemnable
because the discovery process is ‘effectively circumvented’ and the opponent is denied
the opportunity to argue against production of the information. In Re Shell Oil Refinery,
143 F.R.D. 105, 106 , amended opinion, 144 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. La 1992) (ex parte contact with
disloyal employee prohibited; all information from him not publicly available or produced
by employer suppressed, including notes made from information and documents); accord,
X Corp. v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993) (lawyer who alleged but failed to show he
was fired for ‘whistle blowing’ ordered to return 4,300 copies of documents taken by him
from X Corp., and he is “permanently enjoined from voluntarily disclosing X Corp.’s
confidences and secrets’); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 610 N.E. 2d 892 (Mass. 1993)
(lawyer who took papers from ex-employer that he believed supported his claim for
wrongful termination prohibited from ‘disclosure of communications arising out of the
employment relationship that had to do with his rendering legal services, advice, or
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If one ignores these doctrinal inconsistencies and
contradictions, perhaps the most troubling dilemma a lawyer faces
with respect to an adversary’s privileged information is whether to tell
his own client about it. The Rules of Professional Conduct require a
lawyer to communicate with his client and abide by the client's
decision concerning the lawful objectives of the representation.47
opinions.’); Restatement 2000 § 60 cmt. (receiving lawyer must return information
obtained deceitfully or illegally and must keep such information confidential from client);
Maryland Bar Comm. on Ethics Op. 2000-4 (documents should be returned unexamined,
or, if inadvertent disclosure learned of after examination, lawyer must inform client and
counsel and then return documents or seek court ruling.)”
See, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.3, Reporting Professional Misconduct: (a) A
lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
truthfulness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority . . . (c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 Confidentiality of
Information “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent. Whether 1.6 applies to another of attorney’s
client is the subject of this article; see also, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3, Candor
to the Tribunal “(c) The duty stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of
the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.”
47
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2, Scope of Representation and Allocation of
Authority between Client and Lawyer “(a) . . . .a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation . . . as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.2 cmt. [1] . . . (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the
purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the
lawyer’s professional obligations”; Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4 Communication
“(a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or ci4rcumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required by these Rules; (2)
reasonably consult with a client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4)
promptly comply with reasonable request for information.”
Kusch v. Ballard, 645 So. 2d 1035, 1037 fn. 4 (Fla. App. 1994) Lawyer receiving
inadvertently released information has duty to disclose it to his client; Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 99-107 (1999) (Lawyer
required to keep client abreast of potential waiver of attorney-client privilege).
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 95-398, No. 162
(1995) “. . . should a significant breach of confidentiality occur within a computer
maintenance company, accounting firm, or the like, a lawyer may be obligated to disclose
such breach to the client or clients whose information has been revealed. See Rule 1.4(b)
(“Communication”) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Where the
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They also require counsel to act on behalf of his client to carry out the
goals of the representation.48 These duties include consultation

unauthorized release of confidential information could reasonably be viewed as a
significant factor in the representation, for example where it is likely to affect the position
of the client or the outcome of the client’s legal matter, disclosure of the breach would be
required under Rule 1.4(b).
Cf. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 4.4 cmt [3] In a situation where the lawyer learns
before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address then, “.
. . the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment
ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.”
Md. St. Bar. Ethics Op. 2000-4, “The District of Columbia, Illinois and Oregon state bars
have also concluded that a lawyer’s duty to represent his or her client zealously does not
obligate a lawyer to read an unexamined privileged document that had been inadvertently
produced, and that a lawyer is ethically required to return the privileged document without
first examining it . . . Under such circumstances, it is as if no actual disclosure of
privileged material had ever occurred: the material was simply transmitted or sent, but not
disclosed or reviewed. Therefore, the committee finds that the receiving attorney is not
ethically obligated to inform his or her client that the error occurred and was corrected.
Clearly, Rule 1.4 requires communications sufficient for the client to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued . . . [h]ere no decision on the part of the client is necessary,
since the lawyer’s obligation under the Rules are clear . . .” Nevertheless, the committee
also found that “once you have reviewed the material, you also have an obligation under
Maryland Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.4, Communication to inform your client promptly that
you have reviewed privileged documents received from another party, and that you have
certain obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. This will permit your client
to make informed decisions regarding your representation of him/her, or it in the litigation.
. . . if you have already reviewed the documents, your second alternative would be to
consult the Courts regarding the permissible use of the inadvertently disclosed privileged
material before using or further disclosing the information to anyone. For example, once
you have realized the information you have reviewed might be privileged, you might seal
the documents in an envelope without further reviewing them, and apply to the Court in a
sealed motion, for a ruling as to whether or not disclosed materials might be used.”
48
Pa. Bar Ass’n Rep. No. 2000-200, Inadvertent Disclosures (2002) 22 Oct. Pa. Law. 59
(2000) “Lawyer’s Obligation to Act Zealously and Keep Client Informed: Rule 1.3
(Diligence) provides that lawyer ‘shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.’ There is an argument implied in some of the decisions and ethics
opinions that to forego capitalizing on helpful information, however received, would
compromise this obligation . . . referencing ABA opinion 92-368, Pennsylvania Bar also
commented, Model Rule 1.3, “. . . which provides that lawyer is not hard pressed for every
advantage that might be realized for a client. Favoring restraint on uncontrolled advocacy,
the opinion advised that the zealous representation does not include capitalizing on every
error of opposing counsel.”
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concerning the specific means that should be employed to
accomplish these goals.49
It is hardly a reach to suppose that a client informed that her
attorney had received case-breaking privileged information from the
other side would direct her attorney to use that information in the
defense of her cause, whatever the lawyer’s apparently equivocal
ethical duty.50 Again, the attorney must choose between obligations
to her client and her perceived duty however awkward and
discomforting.51

49

Thomas Ross, Lawyers and Fraud: A Better Question, 43 Washburn L.J. 45, 52 (2003):
“. . . this idea of the lawyer as loyal and fearless champion of his client has always
resonated with the profession. Thus, the idea of the lawyer as a ‘gatekeeper,’ putting the
interests of third parties ahead of the client’s interests, runs against both the bar’s sacred
stories and the essential nature of law practice as lived by lawyers across the various
practice domains. . . . moreover, the conception of the lawyer as loyal partisan possesses
real force and resonance. Who among us would want our lawyer to be less than fully
committed to us, especially when we must face the imposing resources of the state? It
seems right, as a general principle, that a lawyer should place his client’s interests ahead
of others. Thus, the suggestion that the lawyer should see himself as concerned with the
public interest rather than his client’s interests collides with a deeply rooted professional
self-conception that has an intrinsic sense.”
50
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. No. 256 (1995) “ . . . if the receiving lawyer were
under some ethical inhibition from using that information, (inadvertently received
confidential information) the lawyer could have a prohibited conflict of interest under rule
1.7(b)(4), [conflict of interest: which could require withdrawal under rule 1.16(a) declining
or terminating representation]. Rule 1.7(b)(4) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client
in a matter if ‘the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or
reasonably may be adversely affected by . . . the lawyer’s own financial, business,
property or personal interest.’ If the receiving lawyer were under some ethical inhibition
from using the inadvertently disclosed information to the fullest in a particular case, his
professional judgment ‘reasonably may be adversely affected’ in that case . . .”
51
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt 1 The client has final authority concerning
the lawful goals of the representation, “. . . within the limits imposed by the law and the
lawyer’s professional obligation;” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1: Advisor in
Representing a Client, a lawyer shall exercise independent judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering professional advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client’s situation.
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Ultimately the lawyer makes a personal ethical choice.52 As in
so many situations, the choice here implicates further conflicts.
When faced with a threat of discipline for failing to vigorously
pursue the goals of the representation,53 together with her client’s
insistence that the information be used affirmatively, the receiving
lawyer may decide, in the face of this conflict, to withdraw from the
representation.54
But here again additional problems arise. Even if the lawyer
assures that his resignation will not cause material adverse effects on
the interests of the client,55 withdrawing from the case may not solve
the real problem.56 To withdraw from the representation, he must

52

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt 1 The client has final authority concerning the
lawful goals of the representation, “. . . within the limits imposed by the law and the
lawyer’s professional obligation;” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1 Advisor “In
Representing a Client: a lawyer shall exercise independent judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering professional advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client’s situation.”
53
See, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.2 cmt [2] “. . . lawyers usually defer to the
client regarding . . . concern for third persons who might be adversely affected . . .” by
decisions concerning the means to accomplish the client’s objectives.
54
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(a)(1) a lawyer shall withdraw if: the
representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(4) a lawyer may withdraw if: “the client insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.
55
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(1).
56
See, Robert M. Contis, Jr. Ethical Considerations: Independent Professional
Judgment, Candid Advice, and Reference to Non-Legal Considerations, 77 Tul. L. Rev.
1223, 1227 (2003) commenting on lawyer’s obligation, under Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct
R 2.1 to exercise independent judgment. “. . . but there are other aspects of independence
to consider; those aspects are the ability and willingness to look critically at what the
client seeks to do (with the lawyer’s assistance) and to assess the client’s quest
dispassionately, free from the client’s bias and apart from the lawyer’s interest in
preserving the relationship in collecting the fee. While the zealous partisan paradigm is
appropriate for the lawyer as an advocate participating in the legal system and interacting
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take steps to reasonably protect the client’s interests, including
surrendering papers and property . . .“ to which the client is entitled .
. .,”58 all the while maintaining client confidentiality. Thus, he will have
to turn the confidential documents, including the opponent’s
privileged documents, over to the client and her new lawyer, and he
would clearly violate his client’s attorney-client privilege if he
voluntarily revealed to third persons that he had done so.
If the attorney believes that his client is not entitled to her
opponent’s privileged papers, and further believes that failure to
disclose the possession of these documents constitutes a fraud,59 he
may then contemplate whether he has the ethical discretion to reveal
this fraud.

with third parties on the client’s behalf, partisanship is inappropriate for the lawyer as
counselor assessing the merits of that client’s cause . . .”
57
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(1); See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
1.16(d).
58
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(d): “Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable, to protect a client’s interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled . . .”
59
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(3) “A lawyer may reveal information
related to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary: (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s
services; . . .” ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 92-368
(1992), while acknowledging that its prior informal opinion 86-1516 is not on all fours,
nevertheless opined that its position informs counsel’s proper conduct upon the
inadvertent receipt of confidential information. Opinion 86-1518 entitled “Notice to
Opposing Counsel of Inadvertent Omission of Contract Provision (Feb 9, 1986), concluded
that ‘error is appropriate for correction between lawyers without client consultations.’ In
reaching this result the opinion was concerned that to do otherwise and ‘capitalize on the
clerical error’ might violate postscription of Model Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel the client to
engage in conduct the lawyer knows is fraudulent as well as the admonition of Model Rule
4.1(b) not knowingly to fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid a client fraud.”
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The Maryland Committee on Ethics has suggested that keeping
and using privileged information is a fraud:60
. . . if the sending attorney indicates a transmission
was inadvertent and asks the return of the
document, they should be returned unopened and
unreviewed immediately . . . in such situations the
receiving attorney may violate Rule 8.4(c)
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, if, he
or she fails to inform the sending attorney of his or
her error, or opens the package after being

60

Md. St. Bar Ethics Op. 2000-4 The duties of a Maryland attorney who receives
inadvertently produced privileged documents from opposing counsel in discovery; D.C.
Bar Ethics Op. No. 256 (1995) “. . . where, . . . the receiving lawyer knows of the
inadvertence of the disclosure before the documents are examined, rule 1.15(a)
[safekeeping property] requires the receiving lawyer to return the documents to the
sending lawyer; the receiving lawyer also violates rule 8.4(c) [engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation] if the lawyer reads and/or uses
the material; see Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E. 2d 1300, 1304 (1994). . . . Rule 1.15(a) & (b)
Safekeeping of Property, might also be violated if, contrary to the request of sending
attorney, the lawyer subsequently opens and reviews the content of the materials. Rule
1.14(a) &(b) require a lawyer to safeguard the property of another which comes into his
possession, to promptly notify the person, and except as otherwise permitted by law,
deliver the property to the person entitled to receive it. Materials inadvertently produced
in discovery fall into this rule.” ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility
Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) analogizing unauthorized receipt of privileged information to
bailment, the committee opined “. . . the receiving lawyer lawfully possesses the missent
materials, but the sending lawyer clearly did not intend to relinquish title to them, either
the physical objects or the ideas reflected on each page, such that they would become the
“property” of the receiving attorney. The common law bailments characterizes such
mistaken possession as a bailment implied by law, or a constructive bailment . . . an
essential element of the bailment relationship is the absolute obligation of the bailee to
return the subject matter of the bailment upon termination of the bailment. (citation
omitted) This obligation to return the property is necessarily implied from the mere fact of
lawful possession of personal property of another . . .” Acknowledging the bailment
analogy as flawed, since the parties did not intend the bailment, the committee went on to
characterize “. . . any attempt by the receiving lawyer to use the missent letter for his own
purposes would thus constitute an ‘unauthorized use.’”
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instructed not to do so. Reading inadvertently
produced material you know is privileged after
learning of an error is similar to copying papers from
an opposing lawyer’s file folder during a break in the
deposition. Such conduct is found to be dishonest,”
citing Lipin v. Bender, 84 N.Y. 2d 562, 644 N.E. 2d
1300, 1304 (N.Y. 1994).
Following this reasoning, if the receiving attorney believes he
has a professional duty to safeguard his adversary’s attorney-client
confidences, then concealing his receipt of confidential information is
a fraud by a person under a duty to communicate concealed facts,61
especially if the nondisclosure to the other side is reasonably certain
to cause substantial injury to financial interests or property.62 In that
case, disclosure might be tempting, but it would be wrong.
Leaving aside the absurdity of sacrificing your own client’s
confidences to protect those of the other side, a lawyer who wants to
violate the attorney-client privilege will find no refuge in the crime-

61

Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W. 2d 159, 174 (Iowa 2002) Iowa Supreme Court
responding to certified question in cigarette case. “Under Iowa law, the failure to disclose
material information can constitute a fraud if the concealment is made ‘by a party under a
duty to communicate the concealed facts.’” This duty is dependent on prior misleading
statements or true statements of fact that influence behavior that new information
subsequently rendered untrue; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551, Liability for NonDisclosure; Involving non-disclosure of a fact that is the defendant’s duty to disclose.
62
See, Md. St. Bar Ethics Op. 2000-4, “The Committee also opined that ‘Rule 1.15(a) and
(b), Safeguarding Property, might also be violated if, contrary to the request of sending
attorney, the lawyer subsequently opens and reviews the content of the material. Rule
1.15(a) and (b) require a lawyer to safeguard the property of another which comes into his
possession, to promptly notify the person, and except as otherwise permitted by law,
deliver the property to the person entitled to receive it.”
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fraud exception. For one thing, unlike Maryland, most jurisdictions
examined in this article do not characterize using an opponent’s
volunteered privileged information as a crime or fraud.64
Secondly, just as we have asked at the commencement of this
article, whose privilege is it, and who is charged with the duty to
preserve it, we now ask, “whose fraud is it?” If the client received this
information directly, he would be under no obligation not to use it or to
return it.66 If the fraud is the attorney’s, and only the attorney’s, then
discretionary exceptions to confidentiality such as the crime-fraud
exception, or exceptions based on substantial injury to financial
interests or property of another, would not apply because these
63

But see, Thomas Ross, Lawyer and Fraud: A Better Question, 43 Washburn L.J. 45, 52
(2003) “. . . This idea of the lawyer as loyal and fearless champion of his client has always
resonated within the profession. Thus, the idea of the lawyer as a ‘gatekeeper,’ putting the
interests of third parties ahead of the client’s interests, runs against both the bar’s sacred
stories and the essential nature of law practice as lived by lawyers across the various
practice domains.”
64
Barry R. Temkin, Ethics, Errant E-Mail, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Material
Poses Dilemma, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2003 at 5 “Unlike the ABA Model Rules, the New York
Code does not explicitly obligate an attorney to notify the sender upon receipt of an
inadvertently sent confidential document. Interestingly, the code does address a lawyer’s
obligation upon receipt of funds or other property belonging to another. DR 9-102(c)
obligates an attorney to ‘promptly notify a client or third person of the receipt of funds,
securities or other property in which the client or a third person has an interest’” . . .
however, the code does not define what is meant by ‘other property,’ and it does not
appear that this rule was initially intended to apply to the type of intellectual property or
attorney work-product likely to be found in an errant fax or e-mail.”
65
Barry R. Temkin, Ethics, Errant E-Mail, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Material
Poses Dilemma, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2003, at 5,) “Unlike the ABA Model Rules, the New York
Code does not explicitly obligate an attorney to notify the sender upon receipt of an
inadvertently sent confidential document. Interestingly, the code does address a lawyer’s
obligation upon receipt of funds or other property belonging to another. DR 9-102(c)
obligates an attorney to ‘promptly notify a client or third person of the receipt of funds,
securities or other property in which the client or a third person has an interest’” . . .
however, the code does not define what is meant by ‘other property,’ and it does not
appear that this rule was initially intended to apply to the type of intellectual property or
attorney work-product likely to be found in an errant fax or e-mail.”
66
Supra note 21, 22.
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exceptions demand two things: First, that the client commits a fraud,
and second, that the client uses the attorney’s services to effectuate
the fraud.67 Here, professional duties, or one’s opinion of them,
would make the refusal to return an opponent’s privileged information
a fraud that only an attorney could commit. Therefore, discretionary
exceptions allowing disclosure of a client’s privileged information, in
this case receipt of an opponent’s privileged information, to prevent
fraud or crime, would not apply.
VII. LOOK BEFORE YOU LOOK: GUESSING AT PRIVILEGE
Additional dilemmas face the attorney who contemplates
withdrawal: Until he reveals the information and litigates the issue,
the lawyer cannot really know whether a court will consider his
opponent’s attorney-client privilege to have been waived, or whether
the information is privileged at all. Additionally, it may be far from
clear that there was mere inadvertence, rather than gross negligence;
and the production could turn out to be a shady opponent’s tactic to
provoke a disqualification.
Civility and rules of conduct, according to 1992 ABA opinion,
direct that an attorney should neither read nor use privileged
information produced inadvertently, but should return it to the
sender.68 But following this advice, as we have seen, could result in
67

Supra note 24, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct $ 1.6(b)(2)(3).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4 cmt [3] “Some lawyers may choose to return a
document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that
it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by
68
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the practitioner being charged with ethical violations, incompetence,
or legal imprudence.
Prudence demands that the receiving lawyer question whether
the information was privileged at all. Opponents can intentionally
waive a privilege of confidentiality.69 Attorneys, as agents of their
clients, are authorized to waive their clients' privilege of
confidentiality. Thus, even if a document is privileged, perhaps the
adversary meant to waive the privilege and disclose it.
For instance, one can hypothesize that an opponent, knowing
of the circumstances of the preparation of the document and its
contents, or desiring to use it affirmatively,70 or knowing of its
circulation to other parties, might well despair of a court holding it to
be privileged and so forward it to an opponent without confidentiality
notices to avoid costly challenges.71

applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of
professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.
69
In re Kagan, 351 F.3d 1157, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2003) Committing on D.C. Board Legal
Ethics Comm. Op. 256 (1995): “. . . the opinion concluded that where the receiving
counsel has reason to believe the disclosure is deliberate, and is unaware that it was
inadvertent, receiving counsel ethically may utilize the information . . .”
70
In re Snell, 232 B.R. 684, 685 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1999) A party who asserts advice or
counsel as justification for actions taken causes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
71
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. No. 256 (1995) “Where a lawyer has inadvertently
included documents containing client’s secrets or confidences in material delivered to an
adversary lawyer, the receiving lawyer in good faith reviews the documents before the
inadvertence of the disclosure is brought to that lawyer’s attention, the receiving lawyer
engages in no ethical violation by retaining and using those documents . . .”; Edna Selan
Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine 163 (4th ed. 2001) “It
has become increasingly common to see parties enter into agreements to disclose
privileged materials provided the disclosure is not taken to entail waiver as to all
privileged matters . . .” (Citations to authorization omitted.) . . .”failure to make an
adequate or timely objection to disclosure either in responding to interrogatories, giving
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If, on the other hand, the document is clearly labeled
"confidential and legally privileged," and also admonishes the
unintended recipient not to read it and notify the sender of its receipt,
does that change the picture markedly? Nowadays, all faxes, e-mails
etc. are labeled with this admonition, without the sender intentionally
segregating the truly privileged from all other communications.72 It is
not unusual to receive a "labeled document" of this description
inviting one to lunch, passing on an inappropriate joke, or
transmitting information, vital to litigation, but unprivileged.73

testimony in deposition or in producing documents may well be fatal to any successful
assertion of the privileged matter at trial.” (citations to authority omitted)
72
Sampson Fire Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 360 (M.D. Pa. 2001) “Despite the
explicit instructions on the fax cover sheet, it should be noted that the ABA’s Ethics 2000
Committee in the proposed comments to amend Rule 4.4(b) state: ‘The use of general
warnings on fax cover sheets advising that the information is intended only for the use of
the individual named on the cover sheet may not be sufficient to put a receiving lawyer on
notice that the fax was inadvertently sent. . .’”
Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, 89 A.B.A. J., July 2003, 42, 45 “Almost every
lawyer uses these disclaimers; some firm computer systems are even programmed to
automatically put one at the end of e-mail message that leaves their office. The result is
that even innocuous e-mails that say things like ‘meet me at two in the lobby for lunch’
now come with a disclaimer claiming to be privileged information. ‘By claiming attorneyclient privilege every time a lawyer sends e-mail, those disclaimers are now probably
overbroad,” Says Poley [Chair of the ABA Cyberspace Law Committee.] ‘If you say
something every single time, you might as well say it never.’ But not only are these
disclaimers overused, lawyers also point out that – unlike similar disclaimers used on
faxes – they appear at the end of a message. ‘A lot of people end their e-mails with these
disclaimers telling you not to read it if you are not the intended recipient.’ Hoffman [Vice
President and loss prevention counsel for Attorney Liability Assurance Society, Inc.] says:
‘The obvious problem with that is if you’ve already read the message and then get to the
notice at the end, you are supposed to forget you read it?’ . . . these disclaimers have not
been tested in any high profile cases, but Polley and others say that it would be very hard
to argue in court that such notices protect privileged information if an e-mail is
accidentally sent to the wrong person. In short, lawyers need to take e-mail messages as
seriously as a memo or opinion letter. Disclaimers are common practice, but no one
should expect them to offer much of a defense should an e-mail be carelessly
misdirected.”
73
Employer’s Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon National Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422, 430 (D.
Kan. 2003) “This ABA opinion [92-368] is not binding on this court. Moreover, this court’s
five factor inadvertent production test largely would be displaced if the court applied this

46

DOCSOAK-9729100.4-RHEAFEY

This label of privilege covering all communications ends up, in
the real world, covering none of them. It is a customary heading, as
common as letterheads, that is not understood as significant to the
question of confidentiality. How can such labeling alert the receiving
attorney to her proposed obligation not to read or use particular
information?74
Furthermore, no matter what is stamped on a document or what
its contents, the receiving attorney often cannot know merely by
reading it whether it is privileged.75 To decide that question, counsel
must know many facts she cannot learn from the document itself.76

ABA opinion to every document marked ‘confidential’ that a party inadvertently produces
in discovery. Labels such as ‘Attorney Client Privilege’ and ‘Attorney Work Product’ are
overused on documents that do not truly qualify for protection. To impose an obligation
on opposing counsel to notify the adversary of every document that is produced during
discovery with such a label is overkill. It would provide an incentive for commonplace use
of these types of labels and would be a wholly inefficient method to monitor document
production. Thus, in this case, the court is unpersuaded that ERC was ethically required
to notify Clarendon that Clarendon had produced the Weller [expert] affidavit.” Court
nevertheless, ordered return of confidential affidavit.
74
ABA’s Ethics 2000 Committee in proposed comment to amended rule 4.4(b) stated:
“The use of general warnings on fax cover sheets advising that the information is intended
only for the use of the individual named on the cover sheet may not be sufficient to put a
receiving lawyer on notice that the fax was inadvertently sent . . .”
75
But cf., David Stanoch, Finders . . . Weepers? Clarifying a Pennsylvania Lawyer’s
Obligation to Return Inadvertent Disclosures, Even After ABA Rule 4.4(B), 75 Temp. L.
Rev. 657, 672 (2002) suggesting that “the other step a lawyer might take is to read the
inadvertent disclosure completely. This makes the disclosure complete, and tilts the third
factor in favor of finding a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Also, a lawyer that files
the inadvertent disclosure in the public domain destroys the attorney-client privilege
attached thereto. This, of course, makes any waiver argument moot because the very act
of entering the inadvertent disclosure into public domain vitiates the attorney-client
privileged. The law is firm that entering an inadvertent disclosure into the public domain
through a court motion or pleading destroys the attorney-client privilege . . .”
76
Jerold S. Solovy, Robert L. Byman, Discovery in the E-Age, National Law Journal,
March 15, 2004 at 11 “. . . Since most courts are going to consider whether reasonable
precautions have been taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, the definition of
reasonable is going to change each time a case gets reported. It was perfectly reasonable
for the government not to realize it had a backup program. It would be less reasonable to
rely on the same excuse twice. In fact, even in the lenient jurisdictions where any
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Even in a jurisdiction that follows “totality of circumstances” law, the
question of whether a privilege has been waived may depend on
facts and circumstances existing outside the subject documents,77
especially whether the forwarding attorney took reasonable
precautions to protect the confidentiality of the information in them.
When asked this question, courts typically weigh five factors:78
(1)

The reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent
disclosure.79

(2)

Laches in seeking return of the information.

(3)

The scope of discovery that produced the information.

inadvertent production is given back, there still must be a showing that the production
was inadvertent. If production is made recklessly without any attempt to learn from past
mistakes, might not a court decide that the mistake is not inadvertent at all?”
77
Simon Property Group LP v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 650 (S.D. Ind. 2000). “. . .
first, how excusable or inexcusable was the neglect that led to the inadvertent disclosure?
Second, is it possible to provide effective relief from the inadvertent disclosure? Third, is
there any serious prospect of harm to the interest of the opponent or to the interest of
justice if waiver is not found?”
78
But cf., David Stanoch, Finders . . . Weepers? Clarifying a Pennsylvania Lawyer’s
Obligation to Return Inadvertent Disclosures, Even After ABA Rule 4.4(B), 75 Temp. L.
Rev. 657, 671 (2002) “. . . the balancing test is cumbersome because it requires a court to
weigh five different factors to determine whether there was a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Often, there is considerable overlap among these factors themselves. More
significantly, courts are not uniform in their application of each factor.
79
See, Jonathan M. Redgrave, Kristin M. Nimsger, Electronic Discovery and Inadvertent
Production of Privileged Documents, 49-Fed. Law, Jul. 2002, at 37, 39 suggesting counsel
check to see if, “. . . computer searches for potentially privileged information broad
enough, . . . [secure] software available that can analyze extensive word matches to locate
potentially privileged documents . . . procedures for human review [that will] assure the
necessary inspection of documents to identify and assert privileged claims . . . [insure
that] the review and production systems well organized . . . review the production set
completed before shipment . . .” Authors also recommend securing court order that
inadvertently produced privileged documents do not constitute a waiver of privilege, that
clients be alerted to the possibility of production of privileged documents so there are no
surprises, and client can aid in the protection of privileged information.
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(4)

The extent of the inadvertent disclosure.

(5)

The overriding issue of fairness.80

This five-part test has been adopted by the Restatement of the
law governing lawyers:
Waiver does not result if the client or other
disclosing person took precautions reasonable
in the circumstances to guard against such
disclosure. What is reasonable depends on
circumstances . . . [o]nce the client knows or
reasonably should know that the
communication has been disclosed, the client
must take prompt and reasonable steps to
80

Walter W. Steele, Jr., Shoot Out at the Not-O.K. Corral or Privileged Client
Communications — Lost and Found in Texas, 33 St. Mary's L. J. 739, 743 (2002); Id. fn 20.
See also Transamerica Computer Co. v. Client'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th
Cir. 1978) (finding no waiver of privilege to certain documents accidentally delivered in
discovery when discovery included 17,000,000 pages of documentation).
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 288-89 (D. Mass. 2000)
Defendant reviewed over 200,000 pages of documents, set aside four small boxes of
privileged information, and placed on a shelf separate from the documents to be
produced. Paralegal working for the copy vendor picked up all boxes, including those
privileged boxes on the shelf, copied and forwarded them to plaintiff. In holding that the
privileged nature of the documents was lost through inadvertent disclosure, the court
pointed out that the ease with which the boxes could have been completely segregated
from discoverable material constituted gross negligence.
Herman Goldner Co., Inc. v. Cimco Lewis Industries, No. 3501, 2002 WL 1880733 (Pa.
Com. Pl. Jul. 19, 2002) Court ordered return of 21 separate privileged documents that were
inadvertently produced. Producing party promptly notified opposing counsel of their
privileged nature and demanded their return. Citing with approval ABA Op. 92-368, the
court quoted Judge E. Stanton Wettick’s opinion in Minatronics Corp. v. Buchanan
Ingersoll, No. GD92-7496, 1995 WL 520686 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 14, 1995) to the effect that
“there really are not three separate approaches to the issue of whether the inadvertent
disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. The case law has developed two different
approaches. Under one approach, the privilege is waived only if counsel intended to
produce the privileged document; an inadvertent disclosure does not waive the privilege.
The major variation within this approach deals with the extent to which the courts will
scrutinize counsel’s assertion that the disclosure was inadvertent. Under the other
approach, the privilege is lost when the document is disclosed. The variations within this
approach range from an absolute ‘strict responsibility’ approach to an approach which
restores the privilege if counsel can show the documents were inadvertently produced
despite the exercise of reasonable care.”
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recover the communication, to re-establish its
confidential nature, and to re-assert the
privilege.81 (emphasis ours)
Among the things courts have said constitute “reasonable
precautions” are these:
1.

Having the issue of inadvertent disclosure governed by a
stipulated protective order.82

81

Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 79 cmt h (1998).
VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D. Mass. 2000) Although court was
inclined to hold that inadvertent disclosure always constitutes a waiver, it accepted the
party’s precaution of having issued an inadvertent disclosure stipulated protective order
which provided, in part, “. . . that the producing party shall promptly notify the receiving
party in writing of such inadvertent production after the producing party learns of such
inadvertent production.” If prompt notification is made and the producing party
establishes the circumstances surrounding the document’s inadvertent production.” in
this case the receiving party did challenge whether the documents were in fact
confidential, and the court held that they were and that their production was inadvertent,
timely objected to, and therefore ordered the documents returned.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D.N.J. 1995) Court rejected
plaintiff’s counsel’s suggestion that the Protective Order included a “blanket” inadvertent
disclosure provision that would permit the parties to turn over documents without a
privilege review, and then assert claims of privilege after production. Court admonished
that to preserve a claim of privilege, parties would have to conduct a privilege review prior
to document production despite a stipulated protective order.
David J. Stanoch, “Finders . . . Weepers?” Clarifying A Pennsylvania Lawyer’s
Obligations to Return Inadvertent Disclosures, Even After New ABA Rule 4.4(B), 75 Temp.
L. Rev. 657, 659 (2002) “A non-waiver agreement is essentially a contractual protective
order that permits the parties to define what will and will not constitute a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege during the course of discovery, including inadvertence. In
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Inc., No. IP 961718, 2001 WL 699850 (S.D. Ind.
May 29, 2001) the plaintiffs inadvertently produced a massive 3,500 pages of documents. .
. . the defendants returned the documents, but then immediately moved to compel the
production of these documents. The defendants argued that the protective order did not
trump the common law principles that support a finding of waiver of the attorney-client
privilege in light of such an unreasonably large number of inadvertent disclosures. The
court, . . . made the defendants adhere to the language of the protective order that they
themselves initially wanted. So long as the plaintiffs’ inadvertent disclosure was not
‘completely reckless’ the protective order was enforceable. . .”
VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1319 (D. Mass. 2002) “In
determining whether the disclosures were inadvertent demands a two-pronged inquiry.
First, this court must determine the correct legal standard for evaluating the term
‘inadvertent production’ in the protective order . . .” [I]n light of the case law in this
82
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2.

Establishing a two-layered system of pre-production
review, in which clerks or paralegals screen for privileged
information, but experienced in-house or outside lawyers
make final decisions about which documents to
produce.83

district, the use of the word ‘inadvertent’ could be interpreted that the parties intended to
protect only negligent disclosures.
See, Electronic Discovery Standards – Draft amendments to ABA Civil Discovery
Standards: American Bar Association, Section on Litigation (2003) for suggested
language of protective order page in e-discovery.
83
United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 179 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
Defendants inadvertently produced 29 privileged documents including their issue
summary memorandum. Supporting the two-layered system of pre-production review, the
court stated “. . . in addition to providing meaningful protection for privileged documents,
such an approach reduces the transaction cost of litigation by allowing individuals with
less experience and training – and, if the review is performed by outside counsel,
correspondingly lower billing rates – to perform the most time-consuming and routine
tasks. Punishing defendant for adopting this common, reasonable, and cost-effective
strategy would not make sense. It would also unwisely discourage other litigants from
adopting economical procedure in the future.” The court also noted authority suggesting
that only attorneys should perform substantive aspects of privilege review, indicating that
using paralegals instead of attorneys to conduct a privilege review was inadvisable, and
only permitted if properly supervised, and suggesting that post-it notes should not be
used because they could be easily overlooked or dislodged. Nevertheless, the court held
that “. . . the reasonableness of the precautions adopted by the producing party must be
viewed principally from the standpoint of customary practice in the legal profession at the
time and in the location of the production, not with the 20-20 vision of hindsight . . .”
See also, Scott v. Glickman, 199 F.R.D. 174, 179 (E.D. N.C. 2001) Confidential
communications from client to attorney contained in box turned over to defendants. In
holding privilege lost, the court commented on the reasonableness of protective measures
taken. “In the instant case, plaintiff asserts that an attorney reviewed the box of
documents prior to its production; however, there is no showing that this review was
extensive, time consuming, or embraced protective measures devised to prevent
inadvertent production of material deemed privileged. It appears from the record
undisputed that the contents of the box were not subjected to the additional inspection
which comes about through a protocol of numbering and identifying documents in
response to a particular request, in advance production. This suggests an inattentiveness
particularly where the plaintiff acceded control of the original documents to the defense by
allowing the inspection and copying of the unmarked contents of the box take place
outside of plaintiff’s counsel’s presence . . .”
Local 851 of Intern. Broth. of Teamsters v. Kuehne & Nigel Air Freight, Inc., 36 F. Supp.
2d 127, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) where court found that defendant’s counsel did not take
reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure. “. . . most notably, defendants’ counsel failed
to label the letter as confidential or to employ a procedure for separating confidential
communications from non-privileged material. Additionally, there is no evidence in the
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3.

Attempting to limit the scope of production, either by
objection or by agreement, especially with electronic
files.84

Whatever steps an attorney takes to prevent the production of
privileged documents should be recorded in a log, as evidence of due
diligence.85 And attorneys should develop a plan to react

record that counsel adequately instructed subordinate employees regarding
confidentiality, or performed a reasonable and thorough review of the opposition papers
and attachments before they left the office, in order to ensure confidentiality . . .”
See, Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-110, Failing to Act Competently “Discussion:
Duties of Competency include “ . . . duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney
and non-attorney employees or agents”; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.3
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.
Martin A. Little, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information: One Lawyer’s
Nightmare, Another’s Dream?, 9 Nev. Law, Sept. 2001, at 10, 11 “A good discussion of
practical ways to minimize the risk of inadvertent disclosure can be found in the book
entitled “Attorney-Client Privilege in Civil Litigation,” which is published by the American
Bar Association (ABA). According to the author, the careful lawyer should make a
practice of identifying privileged communications as such (e.g., by stamping the
documents as privileged) and keeping them segregated from unprivileged documents.
The careful lawyer should also employ two stage screening process for documents . . . the
initial screening should be done by someone with legal training, such as a paralegal, who
is instructed to err on the side of privilege. During initial screening, separate lists of
privileged and unprivileged documents should be prepared. For each document, the
author and recipient should be identified by name and position, along with the date and
general subject matter of the document . . . the next level of review should be by counsel
who, at a minimum, must review the list of documents, and resolve any uncertainties
about whether a document is privileged. Finally, the author suggests that all documents
sent to opposing counsel be marked such that it will be possible to tell after the fact what
was disclosed. Counsel should also retain an exact set of anything disclosed, and review
that set to make sure nothing was inadvertently disclosed.”
84
Richard J. Heafey, Don M. Kennedy, Product Liability: Winning Strategies and
Techniques: § 6.06 “Where Discovery Really Starts for the Plaintiff: Electronic Records
and Other Documents” (2003).
85
For example: Place wholly privileged documents in a separate database from nonprivileged documents. Each document assigned a “P” prefix to its bates number. All
coded data for privileged documents was colored red in the database. A watermark
indicating privilege appeared whenever privileged documents were printed to further
highlight the privilege. Partially privileged documents were appropriately redacted, and
placed in a non-privileged database with a “P” prefix, and data associated with partially
privileged documents was also colored red. To further protect privileged documents from
production, the privilege database was “locked down” so that the ability to modify data
was limited to a handful of people. Finally, standard operating procedures for production
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immediately in the event they determine that a privileged document
has been inadvertently produced.
The catch here is this: No matter how exhaustive a list of
“reasonable precautions” we provide, the receiving attorney cannot
know which ones were implemented by reading the privileged
documents.86 Therefore, it would be imprudent to assume that
reasonable precautions were taken. Any prudent attorney would put
the forwarding attorney to her proof of reasonableness under the
“circumstances,”87 before unilaterally waiving her client’s right to that
information.
VIII. CIVILITY VERSUS COMPETENCE:
WHOSE SIDE ARE YOU ON?
required that the production index be sorted to reveal any “P” bates numbers and checked
for red colored data prior to production.
86
Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And Legal
Ethics: An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska L. Rev. 461, 477 (2002) “A
central criticism of the balancing test [the five-part test] is its unpredictability. Even if the
receiving attorney knows the court will apply the balancing test, ‘she may lack sufficient
information upon which to rest a conclusion because the balancing test turns on the
precautions taken by the other side.’ [citation omitted] And, even if a receiving attorney
were aware of the other side’s actions, she would not be able to predict how a court would
apply the balancing test to her situation . . .”
87
John Blair Communications, Inc. v. Reliance Capital Group, L.P., 182 A.D. 2d 578, 579
(N.Y.A.D. 1992).
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 289 (D. Mass. 2000). “The
party claiming the protection of a privilege bears the burden of demonstrating, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, not only that the privilege applies, but also that it has not
been waived.”
Cf, Steven D. Glazer, Special Issues Relating To Third Party Liability For Trade Secret
Misappropriation, 719 P.L.I./PAT 39, 42 (2002) citing the rule of constructive notice used in
trade secret misappropriations cases. “. . . according to the Restatement, (1) ‘should
know of [facts] if, from the information which he has, a reasonable man would infer the
facts in question, or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable man would be put on
inquiry and an inquiry pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would disclose
the facts.”
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Asking a litigator who receives the other side’s privileged
information to protect its confidentiality is as unfair as it is impractical.
After all, who should be responsible to review documents and
evaluate their confidentiality: the lawyer producing them, or the one
who receives them? Must a lawyer spend time—and the client’s
money—to second-guess an opponent’s decision and analyze all
information received to be sure the opponent really meant to forward
it?
In short, should the duty of diligence imposed by the Rules of
Professional Conduct upon the recipient of confidential information be
higher than that placed by the sending lawyer?88
In other situations in the law, having access to an opponent's
privileged information does not require the recipient lawyer to notify
the careless lawyer of his mistake, or to refrain from using the
information. Take, for instance, an attorney discussing case-specific
confidential information in a public lavatory, in the courthouse
elevator, or on a plane,89 or even when forwarding privileged

88

Supra note 9, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.1: Competence.
See, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal.
App. 1993), holding that inadvertently disclosed witness could be deposed and called as a
witness at trial, the court stated “we think that the manner in which DeVries (receiving
attorney) obtained the information in this case – through documents inadvertently
transmitted to his client – is irrelevant to the resolution of the issue. Assuming no
question of waiver, the problem would be no different if DeVries had obtained the same
information from someone who overheard respondent discussing the matter in a
restaurant or a courthouse corridor, or if it had been mistakenly sent to him through the
mail or by facsimile transmission. Once he had acquired the information in a manner that
was not due to his own fault or wrongdoing, he cannot purge it from his mind. Indeed, his
professional obligation demands that he utilize his knowledge about the case on his
client’s behalf.”

89
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documents to a testifying expert witness.90 No one claims that such
inattention or indifference to the privacy of the information should be
met by holding one's ears or notifying an opponent of his
carelessness.
Similarly, if in deposition or trial a witness is asked for the
details of her conversation with her attorney and the question is
unobjected to—whether as a tactic, inadvertently, or through
carelessness—the privilege is waived and the testimony stands.91 No

But see, Rico v. Mitsubishi, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601 (Cal. App. 2004), review granted, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 210 (Cal. June 9, 2004)
90
Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2000) “. . .
the more persuasive decisions hold that at least intentional disclosure of opinion workproduct to a testifying expert waives the privilege (citation omitted). . .”
91
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Shoot Out at the Not-O.K. Corral or Privileged Client
Communications – Lost and Found in Texas, 33 St. Mary’s L.J. 739 (2002) “. . . perhaps the
best known of the few problematic instances and voluntary waiver arises when a client
reveals confidential information while testifying during a deposition.” Citing Goldman
Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that disclosure
made during a deposition waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to the subject
matter disclosed.); see also, United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F. 2d 530, 539-41 (5th Cir.
1982) (finding a disclosure to outside auditors of internal tax analysis in which attorneys
participated constituted waiver of the privileges).
State v. Savage, 506 N.E. 2d 196 (Ohio 1987), marital privilege waived; Cote v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 290 N.Y.S. 483 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1936) attorney-client privilege waived.
State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W. 3d 831, 835-36 (Mo. 2000) Designated expert
inadvertently provided with privileged documents waived discovery of these documents.
In re Kagan, 351 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (C.A.D.C. 2003) “. . . In Opinion 318 (Disclosure of
Privileged Material by Third Party) (December 2002), the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee
appears to conclude that it would not be an ethical violation for a lawyer to use privileged
information of an adversary even where the lawyer receiving the information in
circumstances where the privilege was not waived: ‘If the privilege status of the document
does not become apparent to receiving counsel until after the document has been
reviewed, . . . it is too late for receiving counsel to take corrective action because the
information cannot be purged from his mind and his obligation of zealous representation
under Rule 1.3 at that point trumps confidentiality concerns.’” (emphasis ours)
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matter what the merits of the excuse an attorney might mount to have
the evidence stricken, it stands.92
No one can or would unring these bells. Once the other side's
privileged and confidential information is sent to his opponent, a
substantial amount of the protected information is lost.93 If there is
92

See, Cal. Evid. Code § 912(a) “ . . . the right of any person to claim a privilege . . . is
waived with respect to a communication protected by such privilege if any holder of the
privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented to such disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by
any statement or other conduct or the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the
disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege and any proceeding in which the holder
has the legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege . . .”
People v. Barnett, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121 (Cal. 1998) attorney-client privilege waived in court
by witness’s testimony.
93
See, Jonathan M. Redgrave, Christine M. Nimster, Electronic Discovery and Inadvertent
Production of Privileged Documents, 49 Fed. Law, Jul. 2002, at 37, “A privilege or
protection from discovery . . . can be waived if its holder voluntarily discloses the
confidential matter to a third person, either explicitly or implicitly through actions
inconsistent with the reasonable maintenance of confidentiality. Thus, the implications of
an inadvertent production are significant: (1) at the outset, even if you obtain return of the
document, you can never ‘unring’ a bell. (2) If a waiver is upheld, the client confidence or
attorney work product may be used throughout the immediate proceedings and even in
other proceedings. (3) In some jurisdictions, there is also a risk that the waiver will be
extended to all documents pertaining to the same subject matter as the inadvertently
produced document. (4) For a client, the attorney’s negligence may offer recourse to
retrieving inadvertently produced documents.” [numbers added]
VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Technology, Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1319 (D. Mass. 2002), citing with
approval In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 925 F. Supp. 849, 855 (D. Mass. 1995) “Holding that
‘waiver of the privilege in an attorney-client communication extends to all other
communications relating to the same subject matter.” Also citing Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc.
v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F. 3d 867, 833 (1st Cir. 1995) opining that “’[I]n general, a
waiver premised on inadvertent disclosure will be deemed to encompass ‘all other such
communications on the same subject,’. . .”
Heidi McNeil Staudenbaier and Sarah Vrotos, The Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Documents: Current State of the Law, 32 Brief , Spring 2003, at 30, 32 “The Fourth Circuit
found that a waiver through an inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents The 4th
Circuit found that a waiver through inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents
constitutes a waiver to the entire subject matter of the disclosed communication (citing
F.C. Cycles Int.’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 73 (D. Md. 1998).
But see, United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 184 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
quoting with approval note Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the AttorneyClient Privilege, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 598, 608, 609 (1983) “It is true that confidentiality can
never be restored to communication that has been disclosed. This loss of confidentiality
can be particularly harmful when disclosure of documents is made to one who is an
adversary outside the context of litigation such as a business competitor. But the damage
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any value to this “disclosed-confidentiality privilege,”94 surely it must
be outweighed by the value of a trial on the merits with access to all
evidence.95

need not extend to the litigation at hand. Litigation takes place in a controlled
environment where lack of confidentiality outside the courtroom is relevant to the
proceedings within. For all special purposes, a court can repair the damage done by
disclosure of a confidential document by preventing use of that document at trial. Indeed,
recipients of disclosed material can be prohibited even from facing questions on them.
Thus, courts can ensure that the inadvertent disclosure does not affect the outcome of
litigation. It appears, then, that maintenance of the privilege despite disclosure can be a
significant benefit to the client. The value of maintaining the attorney-client privilege
despite disclosure extends beyond litigation at hand. The client may become involved in
future lawsuits where adversary seek discovery of arguably privileged materials. If the
attorney-client privilege covering the specific documents was waived in prior litigation, the
client will be unable to assert the privilege with regard to those documents. Thus,
maintaining the attorney-client privilege despite disclosure in one lawsuit preserves the
privilege for future lawsuits.” Compare Id. 204 F.R.D. at 176 holding inadvertently
produced documents should be returned, all summaries or references to them destroyed,
and any mention, use, or disclosure of the documents or their contents prohibit it. On the
question of the unringing of the tolled bell, the court commented “The totality of the
circumstances approached does not destroy the beneficial effect of a rule empowering the
court to find a waiver in some situations. The risk of waiver remains to discourage
carelessness in the handling of privileged documents, as well as to prevent unfairness to
the receiving party if, through no fault of the receiving party, the privileged information
has been integrated into the case. In addition, even if inadvertently produced privileged
material cannot be used formally, it may be used informally, at least in the sense that the
receiving party’s view of the case unavoidably will be informed by it . . .”
94
Michael L. Brody, Reading Other People’s Mail, 25 Litigation 27, 28 (1999) “Frequently,
the most illuminating moment in a lawsuit comes when you read your opponent’s
documents. Put the interesting ones in chronological order, and read the novel that you
have created. The key characters, their conduct, and their motives will leap off the page.
The subplots that introduce bit players and propel the narrative will emerge. The contours
of the case will become clear . . . you will still have questions, but they will be framed by
the documents. Those documents create a factual structure for the trial and define the
gaps that must be filled by testimony or inference . . .”
95
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290-291 (D. Mass. 2000)
where court quoted with approval Magistrate Judge Collins reasoning “. . . that there
would be ‘little benefit’ in continuing to recognize the privilege that has as its foundation
the principle of confidentiality when that confidentiality has already been breached . . .
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. No. 265 (1995) “. . . once read, the inadvertently
disclosed information becomes part of the body of knowledge residing in the mind of the
receiving lawyer, who may wish to use it to further the interests of that lawyer’s client. For
example, under the facts of this inquiry, if the assertively privileged information revealed
that the securities arbitration claimants (whose lawyer produced the documents)
possessed actual knowledge of the truth of matters alleged to have been misrepresented
to them, and if this were relevant to the defense of their claims, respondents’ counsel (the
receiving lawyers) would not likely be able to accord confidential status to the information
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IX. RIGHT AND WRONG AND LEGAL RIGHTS
Parents teach children not to read other people’s mail,
eavesdrop on private conversations, or take another's property.96
and still properly represent the client . . . an interpretation of the ethical rules that required
the receiving lawyer to protect the confidentiality of these materials, would, we believe,
place too much of a burden on the exercise of a lawyer’s obligation to represent his client
zealously and diligently (rule 1.3). As the ethics committee of another jurisdiction
observed in concluding that the lawyer may use inadvertently disclosed confidential
information: ‘once confidential material has been examined, even if briefly, the
information cannot be purged from the mind of the lawyer who inadvertently received it
[Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 93-11 (Dec. 3,
1993).’”
Cf. Myers v. City of Highland Village, Texas, 212 F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Tex. 2003) “. . .
plaintiff asserts that the ‘cat is already out of the bag.’ This argument rests on a narrow
conception of the interest protected by the privilege. The privilege protects both
disclosure and use. Although the harm that the City has suffered to its inadvertent
disclosure cannot entirely be undone, that is not an adequate reason why the Court
should refrain from doing what it can to limit its use.”
96
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Shoot Out at the Not-O.K. Corral or Privileged Client
Communications – Lost and Found in Texas, 33 St. Mary’s L.J. 739, 740 (2002) “A very
rudimentary, and perhaps crude, approach to the problem of leaks is to analogize
inadvertently released confidential information to lost personal property. In other words,
think of inadvertently released confidential information as a wallet that one inadvertently
dropped to the ground. Now, assuming that the wallet has been found, just as the
confidential information has now been ‘found” by the lawyer who received it. In the case
of the wallet, the finder is a thief if the intent to deprive the known owner of the wallet, and
to appropriate to the finder’s own use, existed at the time the property was found and
taken into possession.” Citing Williams v. State, 268 S.W. 2d 670, 672 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994).
See also, Perna v. Electronic Data Systems, Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388, 403 (D.N.J. 1995)
Complaint dismissed for wrongfully obtaining information. Three briefcases containing
attorney’s documents, impressions and strategy in preparation for trial, were left in
plaintiff’s office during lunch break. Plaintiff surreptitiously took documents from
briefcase, photocopied them, then turned them over to his counsel. Court characterized
plaintiff’s activities as deliberate, willful, and intentional acts to gain unauthorized access
to his adversary’s documents.
See also, Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And
Legal Ethics: An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska L. Rev. 461, 467
(2002) Characterizing Monroe Friedman’s “partisan view” and his unrestrained
adversarialism. “. . . the result, as one critic of Friedman noted, is that if ‘my adversary left
a file in my office, I am not only required to look at it, but also I could not return it without
my client’s consent . . . I could not even tell my adversary that I had the file which he or
she left - - even if he or she calls and asks!’ [Citing Bertram Prekel, “Errant Facts”
Argument Proves Too Simplistic, Legal Times, Feb. 6 (1995, at 33)] It seems zealous
advocacy is tantamount to a ‘finders keepers’ rule. One could even argue it is like
refusing to return a found purse to its rightful owner on the reasoning that ‘if you really
wanted to keep it, you would have taken more care of it.’”
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Why should it be different if the child eventually is licensed to practice
law?
What you would not have others do to you should have some
bearing on what you do to others.97 Peer esteem and the collegial
cooperation of the community of lawyers, which may help one better
serve one’s clients, present and future, should weigh heavily in any
joint decision about what to do with another's confidential
information.98

97

Joshua K. Simko, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, And Legal
Ethics: An Examination And Suggestion For Alaska, 19 Alaska L. Rev. 461, 484 (2002) “In
applying this view [citing John Rawl, Justice As Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical, in
Key Concepts in Critical Theory KCCT: Justice, 48, 53 (1993)] to the receiving attorney’s
decision as to how to handle a privileged document not meant for her, one is placed in the
position of possibly being the inadvertently disclosing attorney or client where use of the
document would lead to an unfair result and public distrust of the system. In such a
circumstance, it becomes clear that a rule such as that announcing ABA Opinion 92-368
would seem most desirable. Asking that the receiving attorney not read or use the
document, and notify the disclosing party of its mistake becomes a useful baseline from
which attorneys can evaluate the circumstances and act in a way that would best serve all
interests from behind [Rawl’s] veil of ignorance.”
98
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) “. . . many
difficult issues of professional discretion . . . must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
rules.”
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4 cmt. [3] “Some lawyers may choose to return a
document unread, . . . when the lawyer learns before receiving a document that it was
inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law
to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2, cmt. [2]
“. . . lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be
incurred and concern for the third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of
the very nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because
of the actions in question may implicate the interest of a tribunal or other persons, this
rule does not prescribe how such agreements are to be resolved . . .”; Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct Preamble: A lawyer’s responsibility. “. . . [7] . . . a lawyer is also guided by
professional conscience and the approbation of professional peers . . .”
Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F. 3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) Prison officials found attorney’s
letter to inmates summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the inmate’s claim stored
in a restricted-access section of the prison library by inmates litigating against prison
officials. Documents, and other confidential documents, were turned over to Ohio
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The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct give a narrow, circumspect answer to this problem. Rule 4.4
cmt [3] observes that:
"Some lawyers may choose to return a document
unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before
receiving the document that it was inadvertently
sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not
required by act of law to do so, the decision to
voluntarily return such a document is a matter of
professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the
lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.” (Emphasis ours.)
This would suggest that the current "ethical" recommendations
of the American Bar Association concerning returning confidential
documents apply only where the lawyer knows before receiving the
information that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. But
even here, competence would require an examination of the

Department of Correction attorneys. Position of documents kept confidential by
department attorneys for five months, over which additional documents were obtained
from prisoner’s private files. Over a year later, department attorney sought advice from
Ohio State Bar concerning a section of the documents. Counsel was advised not to read
any more documents and to turn over to the court those documents that were in counsel’s
possession. Thereafter, department attorneys continued to receive and read case related
documents supplied to them by prison employees. Approving sanctions against counsel,
the court stated “Department counsel’s actions in this case do not pass even the most
lenient ethical ‘smell test.’ They knowingly disregarded advice from the bar counsel and
bypassed questions of ethics in an effort to again advantage in this litigation. Despite
their roles as officers of the court, they failed to inform the court of their possession of the
privileged materials until eight months after the first acquisition . . . [D]istrict court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the attorneys acted in bad faith and in imposing
sanctions under the Court’s inherent power.”
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“circumstances” of the production, as well as consultation with the
client.99

99

Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct 4.4 cmt. [3] does not discuss what an attorney should do
if applicable law does not require the return of the document, or why and how an attorney
can refuse to comply with Rules 1.2 and 1.4 when deciding to return the document,
without court order, as a “. . . matter of professional judgment. . .”
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X. CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
A client who voluntarily discloses privileged information to a
third party clearly waives that privilege.100 A client directly receiving
an opponent’s voluntarily disclosed privileged information has no
legal obligation to return it or refrain from using it.101
The rule is different in some states and jurisdictions for the
professional in the same circumstance. A lawyer, as an officer of the
court, and owing obligations of civility to her peers, is viewed by some
commentators and in some jurisdictions as a custodian of the
attorney-client doctrinal privilege. Under this view an attorney has a
general duty to protect privileged communications, including that of
her opponent when such communications have been inadvertently
shared.
This distinction between the client’s duties and her attorney’s
creates a logical disconnect that frustrates attempts at a coherent
legal justification for the rule and creates direct conflicts with other
ethical obligations owed by the attorney to her client.
By definition, all evidentiary privileges keep some information
hidden. In the context of inadvertent disclosure, the 1992 ABA
Opinion, and court decisions to the same effect, recommending

100
101

Supra note 21.
Supra note 22.
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disclosure and return of inadvertently transmitted materials conflicts
with numerous other duties attorneys owe their clients and the courts.
We conclude that the doctrinal justification for maintaining
privilege protection for confidential information inadvertently
forwarded to an opposing attorney is flawed. A correct analysis of the
ethical obligations owed to the court, and one’s own client, dictate
that the evidentiary protection of privileged information is lost if
voluntarily forwarded to a third party, including an opponent’s
attorney.
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